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INTRODUCTION 
ONTRARY to conventional wisdom, in this Article we con-
tend that all rights are relationally contingent. As we demon-
strate, whether a right—indeed, any legal entitlement—is realiz-
able will always critically depend on the relationship between two 
variables: (1) the cost a rightsholder would need to incur to vindi-
cate the right; and (2) the cost faced by a challenger who wishes to 
attack and ultimately eliminate the right. In the real world, rights 
are meaningful only when the cost of protecting them is lower than 
the cost of attacking them. When the converse is true, the right be-
comes ineffective: it ceases to protect the rightsholder’s underlying 
interest. The cost of challenging a right is not uniform for all poten-
tial challengers, but rather varies dramatically across the popula-
tion. The rightsholder’s cost of defending a right, on the other 
hand, remains constant. Consequently, rights will avail against cer-
tain challengers, but not against others. Or, succinctly put: rights 
are always relationally contingent. Furthermore, we show that the 
relational contingency of rights dominates all other factors that de-
termine whether a rightsholder will realize her entitlement. When 
an entitlement is cheaper to attack than to vindicate, its holder will 
not be able to realize it. 
C 
To illustrate, consider the following examples. Assume that 
Brutus Inc., the owner of a large residential building, violates 
Anne’s right of quiet enjoyment. Anne places a value of $3000 on 
that right. However, it will cost her $5000 to hire a lawyer and take 
legal action against the owner. Brutus Inc., by contrast, has a re-
tainer agreement with a law firm. The firm is well versed in land-
lord-and-tenant law and can handle suits expeditiously. Conse-
quently, Brutus Inc.’s expected cost of defense is only $1000. 
Under these circumstances, Anne will choose to refrain from 
commencing legal action against Brutus Inc. 
Diane suffers from ongoing discrimination by her employer. Un-
fortunately for Diane, employment discrimination suits are notori-
ously expensive to prosecute. The cost of the average suit is 
$40,000. Diane’s harm exceeds that amount. Diane estimates the 
harm at $50,000, which means that her claim has a net value of 
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$10,000. Her employer, on account of various economies of scale 
and scope, can litigate the case at $30,000. Taking advantage of 
Diane’s much higher litigation expenditures, the employer can of-
fer her to settle her claim for $20,000. If Diane is rational, she will 
agree; settling the case will guarantee her a net payoff of $20,000, 
as opposed to the $10,000 she will get from litigation. 
Finally, consider the case of Ian, who has just received an omi-
nous letter from Proprietary Images Inc., accusing him of a copy-
right infringement. Proprietary Images further informs Ian that the 
Copyright Act entitles successful plaintiffs to statutory damages of 
up to $150,0001 and then proceeds to offer him to settle the case 
out-of-court for the modest amount of $3000. Ian is outraged by 
what he believes to be a baseless accusation, as he has a valid fair-
use defense that he can prove in court. To do so, however, Ian 
would have to expend $10,000 on legal representation. Hence, act-
ing rationally, he will elect to accept Proprietary Images’s settle-
ment offer and forego litigation.2 
We can now formulate the conditions that allow a challenger 
who enjoys a litigation-cost advantage over the rightsholder to 
force the rightsholder into a settlement agreement that will surren-
der her entitlement or part thereof. The challenger will succeed at 
forcing out this surrender when the entitlement, net of the en-
forcement cost, yields the rightsholder a positive amount that ex-
ceeds the challenger’s cost of attacking the entitlement. To illus-
trate, when Rita values her legal entitlement at $10,000 and it costs 
her $6000 to protect the entitlement in court, Carl will be able to 
challenge the entitlement and force Rita to give it up so long as he 
keeps his litigation expenses below $4000. Notably, Carl would not 
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (providing that a successful plaintiff in a copyright 
suit can elect to recover an award in any amount between $750 and $150,000 per in-
fringed work in a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proof and the 
court finds willful infringement). 
2 This example also shows how a rightsholder’s calculus changes when her entitle-
ment is an affirmative defense against liability. Then, as in Ian’s case, the defense’s 
value equals the defender’s expected liability. If Ian’s defense fails, he might have to 
pay statutory damages in excess of Proprietary Images’s actual harm. As a result, Ian 
will rationally choose to litigate even when his litigation cost is higher than the com-
pany’s cost. As far as settlement is concerned, Ian will accept any offer that will re-
quire him to pay the company any sum below his litigation expenditure. By agreeing 
not to sue Ian if it pays it $3000, Proprietary Images therefore does not make full use 
of its extortionary power. 
PARCHOMOVSKY_STEIN_BOOK 9/11/2012 8:26 PM 
1316 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:1313 
 
be able to extort a similar settlement if Rita were to expend 
$12,000 on vindicating her entitlement in court, which would make 
the net value of the entitlement −$2000 (a negative sum). However, 
Carl would be able to violate Rita’s entitlement with impunity, a 
much worse outcome for those who believe that rights are an im-
portant legal and social institution. 
An interesting and counter-intuitive result that emerges from 
our core claim is that sometimes negative value entitlements—that 
is, entitlements that cost more to defend than the value they yield 
to their holder—will nonetheless afford effective protection to 
their holders. Consider a person who values a certain right at 
$5000. Assume that it would cost her $7000 to vindicate the right in 
court. The right thus has a value of −$2000, which may lead one to 
conclude that this right is meaningless in the real world since it is 
not cost-effective for the entitlement holder to defend it in court.3 
Surprisingly, this cost structure on its own does not make the enti-
tlement worthless or meaningless. The entitlement may prove both 
valuable and effective if the cost of challenging it is, say, $10,000 
and the expected return to the challenger is only $6000. The net re-
turn from challenging the entitlement (−$4000) would fend off the 
challenger. Importantly, this negative sum also does not allow the 
challenger to pose a credible threat of litigation to the right-
sholder.4 The reason is simple: although the entitlement is costly to 
3 For definition of negative-value suits, see, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, 
Due Process, and the Right To Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1057, 1059–60 (2002) (defining a negative-value suit as a “claim . . . too small to justify 
the cost of prosecution.”). 
4 This observation holds true in most cases, but there are exceptions. See Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to 
Sue, 25 J. Legal Stud. 1, 5–9 (1996) (demonstrating that multistage litigation with di-
visible costs often allows a plaintiff with a negative-value suit to extract settlement 
from a defendant by expending—and thereby sinking—some of her costs and credibly 
threatening to go to trial that promises her a positive net return from the remaining 
expenditure); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected-Value Suits, 
in 8 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Procedural Law and Economics 341, 341–
44 (Chris William Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 2012) (specifying circumstances in which di-
visibility of costs and informational advantage allow a plaintiff with a negative-value 
suit to extract settlement from defendant, and surveying relevant literature); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely To Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 437, 448 
(1988) (showing that a plaintiff with a negative-value suit can sometimes exploit 
asymmetrical information to extract settlement from the less informed defendant); 
Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real 
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defend, it is even costlier to attack, and the challenger therefore 
cannot rationally deliver on his threat to litigate. Under such cir-
cumstances, the entitlement will stay unchallenged and its holder 
will be able to realize it. 
At this point, it is important to emphasize that our thesis about 
the relational contingency of rights addresses a completely differ-
ent set of issues than Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s famous scheme 
of “jural relations.”5 Both schemes allude to relationality, but each 
of them addresses a jurisprudentially distinct phenomenon. 
Hohfeld’s scheme lays out the analytics of jural relations with a 
view to achieve conceptual clarity of diverse entitlements, generi-
cally identified as “rights.”6 Elaborating on the distinction between 
rights in personam—those that avail against a specific person—and 
rights in rem—those that avail against the rest of the world—
Hohfeld suggested that rights in rem can be understood as aggrega-
tions of the underlying in personam rights. This characterization 
suggests that all rights—whether in personam or in rem—define 
people’s jural relations as individual units.7 
Our core insight is very different. Unlike Hohfeld, we are not in-
terested in rights as abstract legal concepts. Rather, we are inter-
ested in the way they operate in practice. Furthermore, Hohfeld’s 
analysis was formal in nature in that it was confined to the legal 
specification of rights. We, by contrast, are not interested in the 
formal recognition of rights by the lawmaker, but rather in the 
ways rights and entitlements operate in real-world settings. For us, 
the act of formal recognition is a mere starting point. In fact, we 
show that formal legal recognition often falls short of affording 
meaningful protection to entitlement holders. 
Our thesis also markedly differs from Marc Galanter’s classic 
examination of how wealth disparities affect court decisions and, in 
particular, the formation of legal precedent. Galanter famously 
Options Perspective, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1299–1315 (2006) (using option theory to 
demonstrate that negative-value suits can be viable in a regime that allows parties to 
make piecemeal investments in the litigation, gradually reveal information to each 
other, and negotiate a settlement at any given point in time). 
5 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 19 (1913). 
6 Id. at 29–44. 
7 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 718–20 (1917). 
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showed that well-to-do litigants are able to achieve favorable out-
comes in court and take the law in their desired direction due to 
the fact that they can afford superior legal representation.8 The fo-
cal point of our inquiry is different. We focus on vindication and 
loss of entitlements that occur outside the courtroom. 
This pivotal difference is best illustrated by cases in which the 
entitlement’s vindication requires no assistance from courts. In any 
such case, the entitlement holder will realize her entitlement uni-
laterally: when the entitlement allows her to build a house, she will 
go ahead and build the house; when the entitlement permits her to 
rescind her contractual obligation, she will go ahead and rescind 
the obligation; and when the entitlement authorizes her to use an-
other person’s copyrighted work, she will go ahead and use the 
work. The entitlement’s potential challenger will not be able to 
counter the holder’s unilateral action by taking the case to court 
when the cost of doing so exceeds his expected return. 
Oftentimes, an entitlement will be cheap to attack but costly to 
vindicate. This cost asymmetry will turn the entitlement into a dead 
letter of the law, viable in theory but unrealizable in practice. 
Asymmetric litigation costs that make entitlements unrealizable 
will be present whenever one of the litigants benefits from econo-
mies of scale or scope. For any such litigant, the marginal expendi-
ture on every lawsuit drops as the number of cases increases. This 
condition obtains for many large corporations, for the government, 
and for other repeat litigants. These litigants retain legal represen-
tation for a fixed amount that reflects the declining cost. When any 
of them confronts an opponent with no parallel ability to econo-
mize on the litigation costs, it will usually be able to eradicate the 
opponent’s entitlement. The three examples with which we opened 
our discussion show how this deleterious dynamic unfolds. In each 
of those examples, a wealthy firm utilizes economies of scale and 
scope to destroy the legal entitlement of its weaker opponent. 
In this Article, we seek to make four novel contributions to the 
theory of entitlements. Our first and least ambitious goal is to bring 
together two important threads in entitlement literature: economic 
analysis of entitlements and deontological accounts of rights. These 
8 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim-
its of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95 (1974). 
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two threads coexist alongside one another without meaningful in-
teraction. Several leading scholars of Law and Economics have de-
vised stylized models that analyze asymmetric litigation costs and 
their effect on settlements.9 These models demonstrated that a 
party with lower litigation costs can extort a favorable settlement 
from his opponent—a consequence that sometimes does and some-
times does not erode society’s welfare.10 This economic analysis has 
been highly abstract, insular and divorced from the broader juris-
prudential context of legal rights. Critically, it paid no attention to 
the special role that rights play in our society as protectors of indi-
viduals’ worth and wellbeing. 
Deontological accounts of rights likewise suffer from isolation-
ism. These accounts examine the nature, content, and justifications 
of rights from different philosophical perspectives.11 Collectively, 
they develop a broad and illuminating vision of rights as an impor-
tant social institution.12 This vision underscores rights’ role as con-
straining society’s utilitarian pursuits, trumpeting rights as trumps.13 
Yet, deontological accounts pay virtually no attention to the eco-
nomics of rights’ enforcement14 and overlook the destructive effect 
of asymmetric litigation costs on entitlements. This oversight un-
dermines these accounts’ practical viability. 
The holistic approach we adopt in this Article enables us to draw 
on the powerful insights of each of these bodies of literature and 
develop a more complete understanding of rights and their ability 
to promote social goals and values. 
Our second contribution is conceptual. We demonstrate that, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom among rights theorists, all 
rights and entitlements are contingent in nature. Rights provide ef-
9 See infra note 29. 
10 See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
11 See generally Theories of Rights (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). 
12 See infra Section I.B. 
13 See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Theories of Rights, supra note 11, at 
153, 153; see also Joseph Raz, Rights and Individual Well-Being, in Ethics in the Pub-
lic Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 29, 30 (1994) (arguing that 
rights afford individuals’ interests special protection that is more stringent than a re-
quirement that state officials account for those interests in making decisions). 
14 For one exception, see Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: 
Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (1999) (factoring costs of enforcing rights into phi-
losophy of entitlements). For specifics and shortcomings of this account, see infra 
notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
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fective protection to their holders only when they are cheaper to 
defend that to attack. When a right’s challenge costs less than its 
vindication, the right’s promised protection fades away up to the 
point of non-existence. Consequently, legal recognition of rights 
and other entitlements will result in no protection in some extreme 
cases and in full protection against all potential takers in other rare 
cases, while in the majority of cases its effect will be an effective 
protection against some takers and no protection against others. 
This critical insight is analytically robust and independent of the 
way in which legislatures and courts define and construe rights and 
entitlements. 
Third, and relatedly, we show that in certain types of cases, the 
effects of asymmetric litigation costs are not randomly distributed 
across the population. Rather, they are systemic, favoring certain 
categories of litigants and disfavoring others. In such cases, asym-
metric litigation costs often result in unrealizable entitlements: en-
titlements that are recognized de jure, but cannot be vindicated de 
facto. As a consequence, certain entitlement holders will find 
themselves helpless in the face of meritless, and oftentimes down-
right extortionary, claims. Or, if one prefers to look at it from the 
point of view of potential takers, it can be said that certain entitle-
ments can be expropriated without their holders’ consent and for 
an under-compensatory price. Worse yet, this phenomenon has re-
gressive distributional effects because wealth and litigation expen-
ditures are negatively correlated.15 In addition to uncovering this 
systemic bias, we identify certain legal areas, both civil and crimi-
nal, in which it is prevalent. 
Our fourth and final contribution is normative in nature. We 
propose several potential remedies that will protect entitlements 
against unmeritorious attacks by parties who enjoy a litigation cost 
15 Marc Galanter identified this negative correlation in his classic article Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead. See supra note 8, at 103–04. As we already mentioned, 
this article does not address the entitlement destruction that occurs out of court. In-
stead, it focuses on the rule-making process in which wealthy “repeat players” use 
their cost advantage to defeat the unwealthy “one shotters” and shape legal precedent 
the way they want. See also Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Do-
main, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473, 495 (1976) (demonstrating that owners of high-valued 
properties, who spend more on eminent domain proceedings, receive compensation 
that exceeds their properties’ market value, while owners of low-valued properties are 
undercompensated). 
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advantage. These remedies include fee shifting, punitive damages 
and special procedural safeguards. We explain each remedy’s po-
tential to level the litigation playfield and thereby afford better 
protection to entitlements. We also evaluate the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of each remedy, both in terms of its efficacy and in 
terms of its potential to be implemented. We conclude that the 
most promising solution resides in the revival and widespread use 
of equitable doctrines—misuse of rights, unclean hands, and abuse 
of process—in combination with punitive damages. This set of 
remedies has the potential to deter strategic abuse of lower litiga-
tion costs and will go a long way toward restoring the integrity of 
rights. 
Structurally, the Article unfolds as follows. In Part I, we review 
the economic and deontological accounts of rights and show how 
they both overlooked rights’ intrinsic dependency on the cost of 
vindication as compared to the cost of challenge. In Part II, we pre-
sent our core thesis that rights are relationally contingent and con-
sequently prone to be taken over by expedient challengers. In Part 
III, we identify categories of cases in which this dynamic is perva-
sive as challengers with lower litigation costs can systematically 
force the weaker rightsholders into undeserved surrender of enti-
tlements. In Part IV, we present several proposals for reform that 
aim at restoring the integrity of rights by weakening the power of 
parties with lower litigation costs. A short Conclusion follows. 
I. ECONOMIC AND DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL REVIEW 
The principal difference between economic and deontological 
theories of rights can be summed in one sentence: deontological 
theories allocate entitlements to persons to protect intrinsic values 
of importance to the person, whereas economic theories match 
persons to entitlements in a way that maximizes aggregate wealth 
at any given time. Deontological theories are morality-driven en-
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dowers,16 while economic theories are welfare-oriented matchmak-
ers.17 
For deontological theories, the key question is whether an indi-
vidual deserves the entitlement in question. For economic theories, 
the key question is who is the entitlement’s best user from a social 
welfare perspective. Deontological theories use moral desert as a 
sole criterion for determining entitlements and granting them to 
people. For economic theories, the sole criterion for identifying an 
entitlement’s best user—an individual whose use of the entitlement 
will improve society’s welfare—is utility. 
As we will show, each theoretical approach, albeit for a different 
reason, overlooks the core insight that we identify in this Article as 
the relational contingency of rights. Deontological theories miss 
this insight because they end at the point at which the law recog-
nizes legal entitlements. Deontologists do not look beyond this 
point and, consequently, do not consider the operation of entitle-
ment-enforcing mechanisms. As a result, they fail to appreciate 
that a rightsholder will not be able to realize her entitlement 
against a challenger whose litigation costs are lower than hers. 
Economic theories, by contrast, have no pre-set endpoint: for 
them, any entitlement is a fair game and a tradable unit in society’s 
continual pursuit of welfare. For these theories, entitlements play 
no special role in cost-benefit tradeoffs carried out by policymakers 
and courts.18 These theories consequently do not necessarily see 
special harm in the dissipation of legal entitlements whose owners 
cannot afford the cost of litigation against thrift challengers. We 
16 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, at ix–xi, 28–30 (1974) (favoring a 
strong deontological format of rights as unbending endowments). 
17 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 40 (8th ed. 2011) (“The proper 
incentives are created by parceling out mutually exclusive rights to the use of particu-
lar resources among the members of society. If every piece of land is owned by some-
one—if there is always someone who can exclude all others from access to any given 
area—then individuals will endeavor by cultivation or other improvements to maxi-
mize the value of land. Land is just an example. The principle applies to all valuable 
resources.”); see also Joe Mintoff, Can Utilitarianism Justify Legal Rights with Moral 
Force?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887, 901, 905–09 (2003) (justifying a utilitarian theory un-
der which individuals are given rights in order to maximize human welfare); cf. David 
Lyons, Utility and Rights, in Theories of Rights, supra note 11, at 110, 111, 113–20 
(arguing that utilitarian justifications of rights have no moral force). 
18 See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-
Benefit Analysis (2006). 
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posit, however, that dissipation of entitlements should not be a 
readily acceptable outcome even to efficiency scholars, as it brings 
about socially deleterious consequences. Economically minded 
scholars and policymakers should care about the relational contin-
gency of rights. 
In the following analysis, we develop these arguments in more 
detail. We first examine the relevant Law and Economics literature 
and then move to discuss the jurisprudential theories of rights. 
A. Economic Literature 
Economic theory, being amoral,19 attributes no independent im-
portance to rights as such. Economic literature uses the terms 
“rights” and “entitlements” interchangeably and does not define 
them with any particular degree of precision. For writers in the 
Law and Economics school of thought, legal entitlements are no 
more than bargaining “chips”: legal commodities that can be 
bought or sold in the marketplace. The entitlements’ content and 
meaning are of no consequence either. The only thing that matters 
is for entitlements to be clearly defined so as to make them fit for 
voluntary exchange.20 Indeed, voluntary exchange is the paramount 
value from an economic perspective, as it promotes allocative effi-
ciency. More precisely, voluntary exchange ensures that entitle-
ments gravitate to their highest-value users in a process that is wel-
fare enhancing.21 
With voluntary exchange being the norm, Law and Economics 
scholars view usurpations or takings of others’ entitlements with 
disfavor. The reason is obvious: nonconsensual transfers can move 
entitlements to highest-value users only accidentally, rather than 
by design. More often than not, such transfers erode society’s wel-
19 This feature looms large in Kaplow and Shavell’s seminal juxtaposition of fairness 
against social welfare. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 
11–12 (2002) (attesting that for purposes of economic theory, individuals’ “taste for 
fairness is no different . . . from a taste for a tangible good or for anything else”). 
20 Another purpose of entitlements’ clear demarcation is strengthening of ownership 
that incentivizes owners of valuable assets to put those assets to their best use. See 
generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Deline-
ating Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S453 (2002). 
21 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (famously 
demonstrating that law can unlock movement of assets and entitlements to their most 
efficient users by reducing transaction costs that impede voluntary exchange). 
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fare by benefiting encroachers who bypass the market. Thus, when 
X forcibly appropriates one of Y’s rights, we cannot assume that 
the right is worth more to X than it is to Y. The only inference one 
can draw from these facts is that the net value of the right to X is 
positive, since otherwise he would not have appropriated it. But it 
is impossible to know whether X values the right more than Y, or 
vice versa. Voluntary transfers reveal information about the value 
the transacting parties ascribe to legal entitlements; involuntary 
transfers do not.22 
Nonconsensual transfers not only suppress information about 
the value of entitlements; they also inflict substantive harm: the 
deprivation suffered by the rightsholder. Such deprivations would 
occur even in a world with perfect information about the entitle-
ment’s valuation by relevant actors. Self-interest maximizers will 
not hesitate to violate other peoples’ entitlements when doing so 
improves their own utility. The rightsholders’ deprivation would 
not affect the encroachers’ decisions so long as they do not have to 
redress the loss or face criminal liability. Economically minded 
scholars consequently favor a legal regime that fends off noncon-
sensual transfers. 
That said, legal entitlements make little difference for Law and 
Economics scholars. Consider the Coase Theorem, the progenitor 
of economic analysis of the law.23 In its strong form, this theorem 
stands for the proposition that entitlements do not matter. Under a 
more nuanced interpretation, it shows that in a world with perfect 
information and zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will 
be reached irrespectively of the law’s initial allocation of entitle-
ments.24 Voluntary exchange will navigate entitlements to their 
most efficient users.25 
22 See, e.g., Munch, supra note 15, at 477 (showing that under the voluntary ex-
change system “[c]ompetition among buyers . . . will lead to the development of tech-
niques to discover true seller reservation prices.”). 
23 See Coase, supra note 21. For an insightful analysis of the theorem, see Robert 
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1982). 
24 As explained by Cooter, supra note 23, at 14, “The [theorem’s] basic idea . . . is 
that the structure of the law which assigns property rights and liability does not matter 
so long as transaction costs are nil; bargaining will result in an efficient outcome no 
matter who bears the burden of liability.” 
25 See id. 
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The mechanism envisioned by Coase en route to this economi-
cally happy end is voluntary exchange. Involuntary transfers, how-
ever, are capable of producing the same result. If there were a way 
to ensure that all involuntary transfers enhance welfare, Law and 
Economics champions would see no reason to oppose them. This 
worldview underlies the economic theory of efficient breach.26 Ad-
herents of this theory see no harm in a breach of contract when it 
improves social welfare.27 As Professor Daniel Friedman astutely 
observed, it is but a small step from supporting efficient breaches 
to advocating efficient theft.28 
Efficiency-minded scholars did not overlook the litigation cost 
asymmetry. Lucian Bebchuk, Steven Shavell, and other Law and 
Economics scholars have analyzed this phenomenon.29 Their analy-
26 For a both critical and comprehensive review of existing efficient-breach theories, 
see Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses 
of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939, 1977–2005 (2011). 
27 Id. at 1943–45 (summarizing Law and Economics scholars’ justification for effi-
cient breach). 
28 See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1989). 
Theft, of course, is never efficient. See Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, 
The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 367, 370–74 
(1997) (explaining that society’s unnecessary costs from theft include owners’ defen-
sive measures and thieves’ operational investments that include expenditures on 
transactions with stolen goods); Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking 
and Its Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 163, 184–85 (2000) 
(“[T]heft undermines the tremendous utility of certain intangible benefits associated 
with a theft-free society, such as: the ability to rely on the future presence of one’s 
possessions; the ability to trust strangers not to steal one’s personal property; and the 
ability to enjoy the privacy of a domicile that will not be invaded by thieves.”). 
29 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 548–50 (1991) (attesting that plaintiffs 
in securities class actions extort favorable settlements from defendants because de-
fendants’ costs are much higher than theirs); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. 
Chang, The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement, 28 J. Le-
gal Stud. 489, 510–12 (1999) (noting that settlement terms as compared with expected 
judgment tend to favor the party with lower litigation costs and explaining how fee-
shifting rules can ameliorate this problem); John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old 
Realities: The American Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action, 48 Bus. Law. 
1407, 1415 n.39 (1993) (“[T]he existence of asymmetric litigation costs could allow 
some plaintiffs to exploit this cost differential to obtain a settlement unrelated to the 
merits.”); James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amend-
ment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 Geo. L.J. 65, 71 (1985) (noting that predatory 
litigation can be successful when it imposes disproportionate legal costs on a rival); D. 
Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance 
Value, 5 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 3 (1985) (demonstrating that strike suits with nega-
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ses demonstrated with rigor and precision that a party with lower 
litigation costs can secure a settlement more favorable than the one 
he would obtain under symmetrical costs.30 If that party is the plain-
tiff, the settlement amount he will recover from the opponent will 
exceed the expected value of the suit. If that party is the defendant, 
his settlement payment to the opponent will fall below the suit’s 
expected value.31 This outcome, however, is not inefficient in and of 
itself, as the savings in the trial costs may offset the overpayments 
and underpayments occasioned by extortionary settlements.32 
Unfortunately, these important works have stopped short of 
analyzing the broader economic consequences of this phenome-
non. An actor with a litigation cost advantage may abridge or alto-
gether obliterate other people’s entitlements when doing so is det-
rimental to welfare. Self-interest maximizers will tend to take 
advantage of rightsholders who cannot protect their entitlements in 
court at a comparable cost. Ex ante, therefore, asymmetrical litiga-
tion costs have a profoundly undesirable effect on society: they 
prompt actors with low litigation costs to bypass voluntary ex-
change, encroach on, or otherwise violate other people’s entitle-
ments and subsequently force these people—who must expend 
tive-expected value are possible when plaintiff can exploit asymmetric litigation costs 
to extort settlement); see also William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of 
One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1887, 1902–04 (2003) (summarizing literature that analyzes the effects of liti-
gation cost asymmetries). 
30 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 29, at 510–11. 
31 See id. 
32 Consider again the conflict between Brutus Inc. and Anne, but assume this time 
that Anne has found an incredibly inexpensive and capable attorney who can vindi-
cate her entitlement to quiet enjoyment for a $1000 fee. Aware of this circumstance, 
Brutus makes a proposal to recognize the entitlement if Anne pays it $1000 in return. 
The parties’ conflict, of course, would be best resolved if Brutus were to recognize 
Anne’s entitlement for free. The company’s extortion of that payment, however, still 
leads to the economically second-best state of affairs, vastly superior to the otherwise 
probable scenario in which the parties go to court to litigate quiet enjoyment. Under 
that scenario, Anne’s entitlement will be redeemed at a much steeper price. Brutus’ 
extortion of $1000 consequently can be viewed as an efficient transaction that saves 
the parties and society at large the expense of the trial and opens up the possibility for 
Anne’s attorney to apply his talent elsewhere. As the famous adage goes, “A bad set-
tlement is better than a good trial.” See, e.g., Strong v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 173 
F.R.D. 167, 172 (W.D. La. 1997) (“In this case, I could hold my nose and accept the 
[suspicious class-action] settlement, after all, it is said that a bad settlement is better 
than a good trial.”). 
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more on litigation—into a full or partial surrender of their rights. 
This effect is far more severe than extortionary settlements. 
Failure to attend to this broader issue is not the only shortcom-
ing of the asymmetric-cost literature. This literature is highly ab-
stract, insular and divorced from the broader jurisprudential con-
text of legal rights. As a result, it pays no attention to the special 
role that rights play in our society as protectors of individuals’ 
worth and wellbeing. This neglect is not surprising: rights and other 
rudiments of analytical jurisprudence carry no weight in the Law 
and Economics literature. The economists’ declination to take 
rights seriously33 may well be the logical consequence of their all-
encompassing cost-benefit tradeoffs.34 Yet, it puts the Law and 
Economics literature in tension with prevalent understanding of 
rights among jurists, courts, and laypeople as well. 
The tension, or even disconnect, between the Law and Econom-
ics approach to rights and the prevalent conception thereof makes 
the former vastly incomplete, if not socially irrelevant. Our legal 
system is entitlement-based, and not accidentally so.35 The law 
grants people entitlements to protect their personhood,36 to secure 
their freedom to choose among different courses of action,37 to im-
33 This declination separates mainstream economists from rights deontologists. See 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 92–97, 200 (1978) (asserting and justifying 
rights’ immunity from utilitarian trade-offs). 
34 See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 5 (underscoring normative su-
periority of cost-benefit analysis). 
35 See Jack N. Rakove & Elizabeth Beaumont, Rights Talk in the Past Tense, 52 
Stan. L. Rev. 1865, 1865 (2000) (reviewing Richard A. Primus, The American Lan-
guage of Rights (1999)) (“Rights have been a staple of Anglo-American law and poli-
tics since at least the seventeenth century.”); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The 
Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in America, 98 Calif. L. 
Rev. 277, 281 (2010) (observing that rights “help[] to shape our most important legal 
institutions,” while arguing that rights are absolute only in speech, but defeasible in 
practice when special circumstances call for their removal, and describing this duality 
as an example of “our nation’s most admirable qualities”). 
36 See James Griffin, On Human Rights (2008) (unfolding a comprehensive person-
hood-based account of human rights); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Person-
hood, 34 Stan L. Rev. 957, 957 (1982) (developing a personhood account of entitle-
ments that includes protection of property rights upon recognition that a person 
cannot properly develop herself without having some control over resources in the 
external environment). 
37 See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988) (laying out 
autonomy theory); H.L.A. Hart, Legal Rights, in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Ju-
risprudence and Political Theory 162, 183–84 (1982) (advancing an autonomy-based 
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prove their wellbeing,38 and to motivate their engagement in activi-
ties that benefit our society as a whole.39 Hence, when a person’s 
entitlement cannot be actualized on account of high litigation costs, 
the underlying purpose of the entitlement is defeated as well. 
When an entitlement protects personhood and free choice, its un-
enforceability will make the person less autonomous, force her into 
insecurity, and might even cause her to experience unworthiness as 
a human being. When an entitlement protects its holders’ wellbe-
ing, its unavailability will erode the quality of the person’s life. Fi-
nally, when an entitlement is designed to reward individuals who 
engage in a particular socially beneficial activity, its unavailability 
will deny individuals the benefit they labored to obtain and thereby 
compromise society’s interest in encouraging individuals to pursue 
that activity. Furthermore, society’s failure to redress the plight of 
the entitlement holder will incentivize encroachers who can litigate 
at a low cost to misappropriate others’ entitlements instead of pur-
suing more productive activities. 
B. Jurisprudential Literature 
Theories of rights provide a useful vantage point for analyzing 
the effects of unrealizable entitlements. Theoretical writings on 
rights illuminate the importance of legal entitlements and the social 
benefits arising from their existence.40 Naturally, once an entitle-
ment becomes unrealizable, the benefit it was supposed to gener-
ate is lost. Entitlements bring about diverse benefits, but the meth-
account of rights); see also Charles Fried, Modern Liberty and the Limits of Govern-
ment (2007) (offering an account of rights that underscores the primacy of individu-
als’ autonomy over the government’s vision of the good); Matthew D. Adler, Rights 
Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1, 2–3 (1998) (recommending “moral reading” of the Constitution that perceives 
rights as limitations on the government’s power to set up rules regulating individuals’ 
conduct). 
38 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal 
and Political Philosophy 143 (1982) (“[R]ights always and necessarily concern human 
goods, that is, concern what it is, at least in normal circumstances, good for a person 
to have.”). 
39 See, e.g., John H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms For? (1996) (offering an account 
of freedoms consisting of rights that serve societal good). 
40 For a superb exposition of existing theories of rights, see Alon Harel, Theories of 
Rights, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Martin 
P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
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odology by which entitlements are identified stays invariant across 
different theories of rights and the ideologies they represent. 
Rights theorists compare a regime that recognizes and respects in-
dividuals’ entitlements with one that does not. Theories associating 
entitlements with personhood, for example, emphasize the perni-
ciousness of a rightless regime that exposes every individual to the 
omnipresent prospect of being used as a tool for promoting other 
people’s goals.41 Any such instrumentalization violates personhood 
by eroding the individual’s intrinsic value as a human being. To 
forestall this erosion, the state must set up entitlements that will 
protect personhood.42 
From another angle, autonomy-based theories of rights under-
score the effect of entitlements on actors’ freedom to choose the 
right course of action for themselves.43 In a world without legal 
rights, an actor’s ability to form and act upon autonomous choices 
will crucially depend on the balance of power between her and 
other people whose interests clash with her endeavors. Other peo-
ple may attempt to thwart the actor’s endeavors or even coerce her 
into acting according to their will. Whether they will succeed in do-
ing so will depend on how much power they have relative to the ac-
tor. The dependency on others and their decisions undermines the 
actor’s self-governance and ability to live as a free individual. To 
free individuals of this dependency and grant them true freedom of 
choice, the state must grant individuals entitlements that will pro-
tect their autonomy.44 
Another influential thread in the rights literature associates enti-
tlements with their holders’ wellbeing.45 The wellbeing theories of 
rights maintain that the state’s allocation of freedoms and prop-
41 For an early statement of this idea, see 2 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political 
Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy 560 (D. Appleton & 
Co. 1909) (1848) (“Whatever theory we adopt respecting the foundation of the social 
union, and under whatever political institutions we live, there is a circle around every 
individual human being, which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the 
many, ought to be permitted to overstep . . . . [T]here is, or ought to be, some space in 
human existence thus entrenched around, and sacred from authoritative intru-
sion . . . .”). 
42 See Griffin, supra note 36, at 33–37; Radin, supra note 36, at 1014–15. 
43 See Dworkin, supra note 37; Hart, supra note 37. 
44 See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A Debate Over 
Rights: Philosophical Enquiries 7, 75 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 1998). 
45 See MacCormick, supra note 38, at 143. 
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erty-related entitlements across individuals determines what those 
individuals can and cannot enjoy as they go about their lives. When 
rights are not recognized, an individual’s ability to enjoy her free-
doms and possessions will be severely compromised by the contin-
ual threat of their violation. Other individuals, and the state itself, 
may harbor interests and desires that conflict with the individual’s 
freedoms and possessions and hence jeopardize her enjoyment of 
her freedom and property. If the threat is carried out, it will be 
damaging—sometimes even devastating—to the individual’s well-
being. To fend off this threat to the individual, the state must grant 
her entitlements that she can use as a shield against encroach-
ments. 
Finally, instrumental or consequentialist theories of rights em-
phasize the benefit of the rights’ correlatives—namely, the duties 
they impose on other people to act or avoid acting in a particular 
way.46 Under these theories, the state sets up entitlements to force 
or motivate the entitlements’ subordinates (or duty bearers) to be-
have in a socially beneficial way.47 To this end, the state grants enti-
tlements to its agencies and to private individuals. Those individu-
als are not the entitlements’ ultimate beneficiaries. Rather, they 
receive their entitlements and the underlying proprietary and 
monetary rewards as an inducement to enforce the correlative du-
ties of other people.48 Those individuals thus function as the state’s 
agents and get their rewards in return.49 They are granted entitle-
ments when private enforcement of the law is more cost-effective 
than public enforcement.50 
46 The correlativity concept originates from Hohfeld, supra note 5, at 30 (introducing 
the concept of “jural correlatives” and explaining duties as correlatives of rights). 
47 Not all consequentialist theories of rights are utilitarian. See, e.g., Garvey, supra 
note 39, at 2 (arguing that rights exist to enable individuals to make virtuous choices 
and to impose corresponding moral duties on government). 
48 See Harel, supra note 40, at 197 (underscoring that, in some cases, “it is utilitarian 
or quasi-utilitarian considerations that determine who controls a duty”). 
49 See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1, 13–16 (1974) (identifying conditions 
under which private enforcement of the law economically dominates public enforce-
ment). 
50 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 
J. Legal Stud. 1, 14–15 (1975) (arguing that private enforcement is economically 
suboptimal when government can intensify deterrence by increasing penalties without 
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To illustrate the differences between these theories, consider a 
person who owns a house in which she lives. Assume that a tres-
passer takes over her house, drives her away and denies her the 
ability to use it. Under personhood-based theories of rights, when 
the state does not prevent the trespasser from encroaching and 
fails to remedy the wrong after its occurrence, it allows the tres-
passer to devalue the homeowner as a human being. 
Autonomy-based theories highlight a different aspect of the 
homeowner’s harm. By acting against the homeowner’s will, the 
trespasser deprived her of the ability to make autonomous choices 
with regard to her property. The state’s failure to redress the 
wrong further undermines the homeowner’s self-governance. 
Rights theories that put the premium on individual wellbeing 
will be concerned about the value the homeowner lost as a result of 
the deprivation she suffered. The state’s failure to make her whole 
and reinstate her former status condones the erosion of her wellbe-
ing. 
Finally, consequentialist theories of rights would denounce the 
state’s failure to intervene on the ground that it creates perverse 
economic incentives. The state’s failure to protect property rights 
encourages intrusions of private property and induces excessive in-
vestment in private protection of property as well as suboptimal 
development of assets. This failure also dilutes the value of indi-
viduals’ productive efforts and may even breed violence.51 
Our goal in this Article is not to determine which of the theories 
is normatively or descriptively superior.52 Nor do we need to decide 
making expensive enforcement efforts, while self-interested private enforcers will 
make efforts to realize their entitlements). 
51 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Hay et al., Privatization in Transition Economies: Toward a 
Theory of Legal Reform, 40 Eur. Econ. Rev. 559, 562–64 (1996) (demonstrating that 
efficient enforcement of entitlements crowds out enforcement by mafia and vice 
versa). 
52 The four groups of theories described in the preceding paragraphs track the ana-
lytical divide between the “will” or “choice” theory of rights and the “interest” theory 
of rights. See Harel, supra note 40, at 194–95. Another important aspect of rights 
theories is whether rights should function as “trumps” that defeat competing interests 
even when those interests outscore the rights on the utility scale. The rights-as-trumps 
approach characterizes the personhood- and the autonomy-based theories of rights. 
Id. at 197–98. Some of the wellbeing theories of entitlements adopt this approach as 
well. See Dworkin, supra note 33, at 91–93, 199, 204–05 (arguing that violating one’s 
right means “treating a man as less than a man, or as less worthy of concern than 
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which theory does a better job of capturing the harm occasioned by 
the denial of rights and entitlements. The only thing that is impor-
tant for our purposes is the recognition that some distinct harm is 
inflicted whenever a person is denied her entitlement. Whether the 
main harm from the entitlement’s denial comes from the erosion of 
the holder’s personhood, autonomy, or wellbeing, or from the loss 
to society at large, is a question that need not be resolved here. All 
rights theorists agree that denial of rights invariably leads to harm, 
and we proceed from this premise as well. 
The case of denial of a right, however, is not identical to the case 
of unrealizable entitlements. In the latter case, a person’s entitle-
ment is not denied. In fact, the legal system is ready to enforce it, 
but the person cannot afford to vindicate it in court. One might ar-
gue that although this result is unquestionably regrettable, it is 
morally and economically different from a deliberate denial or 
suppression of a person’s right. Both analytically and as a matter of 
substance, unrealizability of entitlements presents a distinct prob-
lem that calls for independent analysis. In the case of unrealizable 
entitlements, the core problem is not the state’s refusal to recog-
nize a certain entitlement but rather the cost of enforcement. Yet 
from the vantage point of the entitlement holder, inability to en-
force the entitlement will in many cases have the same effect as not 
having the entitlement to begin with. 
Unrealizability of entitlements may not present a problem that 
calls for legal intervention when it happens accidentally in a small 
number of cases. Such cases, while unfortunate, do not threaten to 
unravel our entitlements-based system. However, when an entitle-
ment is systematically turned into a dead letter of the law, policy-
makers have serious cause for concern. Accepting this state of af-
fairs may bring about socially devastating consequences. This can 
be most readily seen in the case of criminal prosecutions. Consider 
the case of an unscrupulous prosecutor who files misdemeanor 
other men” and that rights constitute “the majority’s promise to the minorities that 
their dignity and equality will be respected.”). Under the prevalent—welfare-
oriented—consequentialist accounts, rights are defeasible in the sense that a cost-
benefit analysis can justify their removal. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Overcoming 
Law 387–405 (1995). These differences do not affect our discussion of entitlements’ 
unrealizability. 
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charges against multiple defendants to induce guilty pleas.53 While 
the charges are baseless, defending oneself against them is expen-
sive—indeed, costlier than pleading guilty to and getting punished 
for a relatively minor misdemeanor charge. Under these circum-
stances, all rational defendants—both guilty and innocent—will 
likely plead guilty. 
The same might happen in other areas of the law. Individuals 
and corporations may systematically use their relative cost advan-
tages to erode entitlements that arise out of property and contrac-
tual arrangements, and even constitutional rights. In Part III, we 
illustrate this deleterious potential by providing examples that in-
volved the entitlements of insurance holders, intellectual property 
users, and criminal defendants. But, of course, systematic asymme-
tries in litigation costs pervade other areas of the law as well. Tax-
payers often face a similar problem in their dealings with the tax 
authorities. 
Loss of entitlements on account of high enforcement costs 
should alarm policymakers for several reasons. First, and most ob-
viously, it harms the entitlement holder. Rights theorists may dis-
agree whether the harm is to her personhood, autonomy, or well-
being, but none will contest the fact that she suffered some serious 
harm. Second, entitlement erosion undermines the goals of society 
at large since it upsets the balance of powers and freedoms within 
society. After all, entitlements are granted for a reason and their 
systematic non-enforcement therefore impairs policymaking. 
Third, the possibility of entitlements’ erosion creates a perverse in-
centive for third parties to deliberately intrude on others’ entitle-
ments. Correspondingly, it induces inefficient changes in the be-
havior of entitlement holders who foresee the possibility that they 
will not be able to enforce their legal rights and privileges. 
With one important exception, existing theories of rights have 
overlooked the cost of enforcing rights almost completely and have 
paid no heed to the social cost of enforcing rights. The exception is 
Professors Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein’s analysis of rights 
that centers on the cost of enforcement.54 Specifically, Holmes and 
Sunstein demonstrated how the social cost of enforcing rights alters 
53 See infra Section III.C. 
54 See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 18–22. 
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our conventional understanding of rights. Their account begins 
with a simple observation that rights cannot vindicate themselves: 
they always require enforcement and are often contested. Society, 
therefore, needs to set up adjudicative procedures and other costly 
mechanisms for enforcing rights, and it will have to pay for those 
mechanisms with its taxpayers’ money. Society’s need to subsidize 
rights thus unravels the classic distinction between the so-called 
“negative rights” that fend off interference with the rights’ holders 
and the so-called “positive rights” to welfare.55 Because society 
must (and does) subsidize the protection of negative rights, the en-
forcement of which is often costly,56 negative rights too are 
grounded in welfare.57 If society were to remove its welfare protec-
tion from negative rights, it would doom many of them to extinc-
tion.58 
Holmes and Sunstein’s account of rights is important both ana-
lytically and practically. It provides guidance as to real-world poli-
cies. However, it fails to notice a crucial dynamic that determines 
the effect of entitlements’ enforcement cost on their holders’ abil-
ity to realize them. Whether an entitlement holder will choose to 
protect an entitlement does not only depend on how much it costs 
her to vindicate it in court but also—indeed, primarily—on an at-
tacker’s cost of challenging the entitlement. When the cost of chal-
lenging an entitlement is prohibitive, the entitlement will not be 
challenged and its holder will be able to enjoy it for free. Hence, 
the fact that an entitlement is costly to enforce does not by itself 
imply that it will not be realized in the absence of a subsidy from 
the government. A state subsidy is required only when a third 
party is willing to expend money and effort to challenge the enti-
tlement. As we showed, this will often happen when the challenger 
enjoys a significant cost advantage over the entitlement holder. 
Contrariwise, when the cost of challenging (or taking over) an 
entitlement is systematically lower than the cost of defending it, the 
entitlement may become unrealizable. The entitlement holders will 
choose to forego its enforcement, effectively relinquishing it. This 
55 Id. at 218–22. 
56 Id. at 43–44. 
57 Id. at 222. 
58 Id. at 44 (“[A]ll rights presuppose taxpayer funding of effective supervisory ma-
chinery for monitoring and enforcement.”). 
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insight has profound implications for law enforcement. The gov-
ernment must not rush to expend taxpayers’ money on subsidizing 
the defense of entitlements. Instead, it can tax attacks on entitle-
ments by imposing special procedural and evidentiary burdens 
upon anyone who deliberately seeks to deprive others of their enti-
tlements by utilizing economies of scale or scope. In Part IV below, 
we make a number of proposals that follow this approach. 
II. THE RELATIONAL CONTINGENCY THESIS 
In this Part, we present the core thesis of the Article, which 
holds that all entitlements are relationally contingent. Accordingly, 
legal formalization of rights and entitlements does not guarantee 
their effectiveness against all intended duty holders. In the real 
world, rights will oftentimes fail to protect the underlying value 
they were enacted to defend, and, worse yet, may expose the right-
sholder to predation by others. As we will show, this insight has 
far-reaching implications for the way policymakers and scholars 
think about rights and entitlements. However, before proceeding 
to analyze these implications, we will first position our core thesis 
within the larger framework of the rights literature and explain 
what causes rights and entitlements to be relationally contingent in 
the real world. 
The conceptual literature on rights and entitlements is too vast 
to be summarized in a single article. At a risk of a mild overgener-
alization, the literature may be divided into two categories. The 
first may be termed as “rights idealism.”59 It consists of analytical 
examination of rights and entitlements as ideal legal concepts op-
erating in a constraint-free world. The main contributions to this 
genre were made by legal philosophers seeking to understand and 
illuminate the concept of rights. This body of scholarship is largely 
divorced from real-world constraints and pragmatic concerns, such 
as cost and how rights and entitlements operate in reality. Scholars 
who work in this tradition see their mission as elucidating the es-
sential characteristics of legal entitlements, offering typologies of 
entitlements, and positioning entitlements within the greater 
framework of legal concepts. These scholars are by and large 
59 For an important critique of rights idealism in constitutional law, see Daryl J. Lev-
inson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1999).  
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avowed deontologists, who proceed on the assumption that enti-
tlements, once formalized, are readily capable of performing the 
tasks assigned to them by lawmakers. 
Ronald Dworkin’s highly influential work60 provides a useful il-
lustration. Characterizing rights as “trumps,” Dworkin advances a 
powerful argument for why rights should prevail over utilitarian 
considerations. This argument develops a purist and highly ab-
stracted conception of rights, unaffected by institutional constraints 
and real-world interactions. Dworkin postulates that rights have 
independent existence and viability and are also equipped with the 
special power to fend off utilitarian challenges.61 Understandably, 
he does not even consider the possibility that the same utilitarian 
factors he dismisses may render rights ineffective on the ground in 
such a way that courts will not be able to salvage them. The cost of 
enforcing legal rights is the most significant of those factors. In 
other words, Dworkin and other rights idealists have ignored the 
basic fact that rights are not self-enforcing and hence inherently 
vulnerable to cost constraints. 
The second thread in the rights literature is best described as 
“court-centered theories of entitlements.” By contrast to “rights 
idealism,” this body of scholarship focuses exclusively on how enti-
tlements are implemented by courts. Contributors to this scholar-
ship are predominantly pragmatists, who take an avowedly practi-
cal approach that seeks to explain how rights affect litigation 
outcomes. This approach to entitlements is taken by virtually all 
Law and Economics specialists and by a smaller number of Law 
and Society scholars. The celebrated “Cathedral” article by Guido 
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed62 vividly illustrates the Law and 
Economics scholars’ approach. This article offers a fascinating ac-
count of how courts should protect legal entitlements—the Law 
and Economics equivalent of rights. Alas, as Carol Rose correctly 
observes, “Cathedral” at its core is an article about remedies rather 
than about entitlements as such.63 The article enumerates three re-
60 Dworkin, supra note 33. 
61 Id. 
62 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
63 See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2177–82 
(1997). 
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medial modes of entitlements’ protection—property rules, liability 
rules, and inalienability—and then moves on to tell readers how to 
choose the right mode of protection in order to maximize social 
welfare.64 
Law and Society scholars, for their part, focus on the legal proc-
ess more broadly. Specifically, they explore how inequalities in 
wealth distribution might distort legal processes and lead to so-
cially inequitable results irrespective of the initial allocation of 
rights. This line of scholarly work builds on Marc Galanter’s semi-
nal essay “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead,” which demon-
strates how affluent litigants can obtain more favorable outcomes 
in courts on account of superior legal representation.65 
Surprisingly, scant attention has been paid to the role of entitle-
ments outside the courts. Neither trend has consistently examined 
this important aspect of legal entitlements. Our analysis seeks to 
redress this omission. We would like to emphasize at this point that 
we do not intend to challenge any of the existing accounts of legal 
entitlements. Rather, our aspiration is to complement these ac-
counts. We readily acknowledge the importance of legal formaliza-
tion of entitlements. Formalization of entitlements lowers informa-
tion costs for holders and duty bearers, economizes on individuals’ 
compliance costs, facilitates adjudication and dispute resolution 
expenses, and enables voluntary exchange. It also makes entitle-
ments more valuable to their holders by giving them effect vis-à-vis 
the largest possible number of individuals and by putting the coer-
cive powers of the state at the rightsholders’ disposal.66 We likewise 
recognize the important role of courts and legal processes in pro-
tecting rights. Indeed, the fact that entitlements must be vindicated 
via legal process is what makes them relationally contingent. 
Our account differs from the previous accounts of rights in that 
it focuses on the role that legal entitlements play in real-world in-
teractions between actors. Accordingly, the discussion in the pages 
ahead aims to bridge the gap between rights idealism and the 
court-centered theories of entitlements. Temporally, we are inter-
ested in the period after an entitlement’s formalization but before 
64 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1092–93, 1096–98. 
65 See Galanter, supra note 8, at 103–04, 114. 
66 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation (May 8, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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it becomes the subject of litigation. To paraphrase a famous legal 
metaphor,67 we focus primarily on the unmaking of entitlements in 
the shadow of the litigation costs and on how to prevent this. 
To illustrate, consider the famous jurisprudential distinction be-
tween rights in rem and rights in personam. As any person trained 
in the law knows, rights in rem avail against the rest of the world, 
while rights in personam are effective vis-à-vis a certain individual 
or a specified group of individuals. The accepted lore holds that an 
entitlement’s formal recognition as a right in rem or a right in per-
sonam determines the group of individuals against whom the enti-
tlement is effective. Rights and entitlements are not self-enforcing, 
however. Most of the time, their subordinates—the duty holders—
will respect them. But there will be cases in which duty holders will 
fail to respect entitlements and may even violate them deliberately. 
In such cases, the entitlement holder will have to rely on the legal 
process to protect her entitlement. The legal process is not cost 
free. Litigation requires investment of resources—in many cases, a 
substantial investment. When an entitlement holder does not have 
the financial wherewithal to vindicate the entitlement in court, the 
entitlement will fail to protect her regardless of its classification as 
a right in personam or a right in rem. In reality, the group against 
which the right avails may be a null set. 
This observation about the effectiveness of rights and legal enti-
tlements is not confined to extreme cases. On the contrary, it can 
be generalized. Rightsholders who have the financial means to pro-
tect their entitlements may rationally choose not to do so as well 
when the cost of vindicating the entitlement in court exceeds the 
benefit thereof. One might think that this is not too troubling; after 
all, the owner should decide whether to vindicate her right and at 
what cost. However, this narrow view ignores the incentive effect 
of the cost-driven desertion of entitlements on their subordinates. 
Opportunists with low litigation costs can violate others’ entitle-
ments, thereby compromising the values that the entitlements are 
set to protect. 
In reality, therefore, the effectiveness of a legal entitlement de-
pends on two factors: (1) the cost of defending the entitlement in 
67 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 997 (1979). 
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court; and (2) the cost of challenging it. Consequently, actors with 
low litigation costs are able to force rightsholders to forfeit their 
entitlements. They can achieve this result by violating or misap-
propriating those entitlements and then offering the rightsholders 
an unconscionable settlement that the rightsholders have no choice 
but to accept. 
Condoning misappropriation of others’ entitlements on account 
of asymmetric litigation costs is neither fair nor efficient. From a 
moral standpoint, such misappropriations are akin to extortion or, 
at best, to unconscionable transactions. From an economic stand-
point, they represent opportunistic transfers that are welfare di-
minishing. The existing state of affairs creates an incentive for ac-
tors to forego productive activities and search, instead, for 
entitlements that are prone for the taking. Social resources will sys-
tematically be wasted in this way. Worse yet, when any such waste-
ful predation endeavor compromises an entitlement originating 
from a productive endeavor of its holder (or the holder’s predeces-
sor), it breeds opportunism and extortion. By forcing transfers of 
wealth from the productive sector to opportunists, such endeavors 
will bring about a socially perverse regrouping of occupations and 
talent.68 
Importantly, the relational contingency of entitlements cuts 
across wealth lines. The phenomenon is not confined to poor right-
sholders, and can also strike the rich. The wealthy, too, may ration-
ally elect to forfeit their rights in order to avoid litigation. To see 
one such scenario, consider again the fair-use dispute between Ian 
and Proprietary Images.69 Assume now that Ian is incredibly 
wealthy, indeed, wealthier than Proprietary Images. Proprietary 
Images, however, can litigate the dispute at a much lower cost ow-
ing to economies of scale that Ian does not enjoy. These economies 
accrue to Proprietary Images by dint of the fact that it has litigated 
multiple similar cases in the past and has ready access to all the le-
gal resources—physical and human—necessary to litigate the case 
against Ian at a negligible cost. The law firm representing Proprie-
tary Images has developed a standard method of prosecuting the 
68 Cf. Daron Acemoglu, Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent, 39 Eur. 
Econ. Rev. 17, 18, 20, 27, 32 (1995) (identifying similar dynamics in societies that tol-
erate corruption). 
69 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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client’s copyright suits against alleged infringers like Ian. Ian, by 
contrast, will incur a much greater expense if he decides to defend 
against Proprietary Images’s claim. He will have to retain an attor-
ney solely for the purpose of dealing with the infringement allega-
tion. His attorney will then have to educate herself about the facts 
of the case and applicable legal rules without being able to reuse 
this knowledge in future cases and spread the cost of its acquisition 
across multiple clients. Ian’s bill for attorney services therefore will 
not be discounted by economies of scale and scope. Importantly, 
the gap between the parties’ expenses will only widen if the case 
goes to court, as the preparation time for Ian’s attorney is likely to 
be more substantial than that for Proprietary Images’s lawyers. 
Worse yet, Ian may be subject to hourly billing, which will further 
drive his cost up. 
Being incredibly wealthy (by hypothesis), Ian can pay virtually 
any legal bill. Unlike most defendants in his position, he can afford 
sticking to his guns and fighting Proprietary Images in court even 
at the cost of $10,000. This course of action, however, would only 
be rational if Ian valued his psychological satisfaction from the vic-
tory as worth $7000 or more. Otherwise, it would still be most ra-
tional for him to surrender to Proprietary Images’s demand and 
pay the company $3000. 
Our relational-contingency thesis has an interesting and counter-
intuitive implication that we mentioned in the Introduction. This 
implication concerns negative-value entitlements—ones that cost 
more to vindicate than the value they yield to their holders. Ac-
cording to widely held intuition, such entitlements are tantamount 
to a dead letter of the law unless they are sufficiently similar to 
each other to be consolidated into a class action—a proceeding 
that utilizes economies of scale and transforms many negative-
value suits into a single action with a positive net value. However, 
this intuition is inaccurate as it ignores the relational contingency 
of entitlements. When the cost of an entitlement’s vindication ex-
ceeds its value to the holder, she will not expend resources and ef-
fort on vindicating the entitlement in court. The entitlement, how-
ever, may nevertheless provide her with effective protection if the 
cost faced by potential challengers is higher still. To illustrate, as-
sume that Anne values her entitlement to live in a nuisance-free 
environment at $1000. However, Anne’s expected cost of vindicat-
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ing this entitlement in court is $1500. Thus, the entitlement has a 
net value of −$500. Nonetheless, it will afford Anne effective pro-
tection against her neighbor Ben if Ben’s expected value from 
playing loud music is $500 while his cost of defending himself, if 
sued, is $3000. If Ben causes Anne a nuisance, she can credibly 
threaten litigation and offer Ben to settle for $2000. Anticipating 
this result, Ben will abstain from violating Anne’s entitlement ab 
initio. 
This happy outcome, however, is far from typical. As we have 
shown, the relational contingency of rights will oftentimes lead to 
the opposite scenario: an individual or, more realistically, a large 
corporation will use its cost advantage in litigation to force out the 
surrender of a weaker opponent’s entitlement. We now turn to 
identify and discuss the most recurrent of those scenarios. 
III. THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCE OF RELATIONAL 
CONTINGENCY FOR CATEGORIES OF RIGHTS 
Not all litigants are created equal—at least, not as far as litiga-
tion costs are concerned. While courts treat everyone equally in 
principle, some litigants enjoy a cost advantage over others. Two 
things need to be clarified at the outset in connection with this ob-
servation. First, cost advantage in litigation does not always posi-
tively correlate with wealth. Wealth allows people and firms to se-
cure good legal representation for a price. But it does not, on its 
own, give a litigant a cost advantage. Cost advantage exists only 
when a party can litigate at a lower cost than her adversary. Sec-
ond, cost advantage does not guarantee a victory in court. The ac-
tual outcome of a dispute depends on the merits of one’s claims. 
The significance of lower litigation costs lies elsewhere: it enables a 
party who can litigate more cost-effectively to extract favorable 
settlements from its opponents. Or, to put it in contractual par-
lance, lower litigation costs improve a party’s bargaining power. 
This is especially true under the American legal system under 
which each litigant normally bears her own costs. 
Asymmetry in litigation costs may arise by dint of the design of 
legal rules—substantive, procedural, or evidentiary. For example, 
the law can interpose heightened pleading and proof requirements 
in order to make it hard for plaintiffs to file and prosecute certain 
suits. Consider the legal rules governing securities fraud. Under the 
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),70 a 
securities fraud action cannot survive motion to dismiss when the 
plaintiff does not provide a detailed account of the defendant’s 
“scienter” or fails to substantiate his allegations of “scienter” by 
evidence.71 This rule blocks potentially unmeritorious class actions 
that may unjustifiably erode the firm’s stock value and reputation 
on the market.72 At the same time, the rule makes it difficult for 
plaintiffs to commence securities fraud actions.73 
Conversely, the law can make it easier for plaintiffs to prove 
their case. To this end, it may adopt various presumptions that fa-
vor plaintiffs (such as res ipsa loquitur) or employ procedural and 
evidentiary rules that economize on plaintiffs’ costs. Similarly, the 
law can increase the relative cost of litigation for defendants by 
fashioning complex multifactor defenses that can only be proved at 
a significant cost. For example, Section 11(e) of the Securities Act 
of 1933 allows a defendant who made “any [false or misleading] 
statement [with respect to any material fact] in any application, re-
port, or document filed pursuant to [the Act]”74 to avoid liability by 
proving that the alleged securities’ drop in market price would 
have occurred anyway.75 This “negative causation” defense is com-
plicated and very hard to establish. Courts have decided that 
“Congress’ desire to allocate the risk of uncertainty to the defen-
dants”76 calls for the imposition of stringent proof requirements 
upon defendants who invoke this defense.77 Specifically, any such 
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
70 Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
71 For discussion of this rule and the relevant case law and literature, see Richard A. 
Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 Geo. L.J. 1743, 1762–65 (2005). 
72 Id. 
73 See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 598, 622–23 (2007) (demonstrating empiri-
cally that alongside their discouragement of frivolous suits, the PSLRA’s heightened 
pleading and proof requirements have discouraged many meritorious suits by making 
them unprofitable). 
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2006) (codified version). 
75 Pub. L. No. 73-22, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 83 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k(e) (2006)). 
76 Akerman v. Oryx Commc’ns, 810 F.2d 336, 341 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
77 Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 234 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(citing and quoting Akerman, 810 F.2d at 341). 
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decline in the stock’s value “resulted ‘solely’ from factors other 
than the material omissions [or misstatements].”78 To establish the 
requisite disassociation, the defendant must furnish expert testi-
mony that carries out an event study or other economic analysis of 
the affected stock’s fluctuations.79 The cost of this testimony and 
the underlying expert work will usually be high.80 The prospect of 
78 Akerman v. Oryx Commc’ns, 609 F. Supp. 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting 
Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added)). The 
Akerman trial court further observed that “[t]he influence of general market fac-
tors . . . entitles defendants only to an appropriate reduction of damages” and that 
“[t]he legislative choice to impose the burden of proof on defendants under section 
11(e) represents a judgment that the risk of any uncertainty as to causality must fall 
upon defendants in order to insure the full disclosure that is the primary goal of the 
Act.” Id. at 371–72. The court referred in this connection to the Supreme Court’s vi-
sion of burdens of proof as “[serving] to allocate the risk of error between the litigants 
and [indicating] the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” Id. at 371 
(quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)). For similar 
interpretations of Section 11(e) of the Securities Act, see In re Adams Golf, Inc., Sec. 
Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 343, 347 (D. Del. 2009) (requiring defendant asserting Section 
11(e) defense to prove “negative causation” (citing Akerman, 810 F.2d at 340, and 
Collins, 605 F.2d at 114)); see also In re DDI Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 03-7063 NM, 
2005 WL 3090882, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2005) (attesting that defendant’s proof 
burden under Section 11(e) is “heavy” (citing In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F. 
Supp. 2d 804, 867–68 (S.D. Tex. 2004))). 
79 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 720 
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that “[o]ne method increasingly recognized by courts and 
mandated by some of them is an event study, a statistical method of measuring the 
effect of a particular event such as a press release . . . or a prospectus, on the price of a 
company’s stock” and citing court decisions (footnote omitted)); In re N. Telecom 
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary 
judgment for defendants where their expert’s event study, uncontroverted by the 
plaintiffs, showed that none of the challenged statements caused increases in the stock 
price); see also Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Trou-
bling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 Stan. J.L. 
Bus. & Fin. 183, 187–88, 260 (2009) (documenting and criticizing the prevalence of 
event studies in securities fraud litigation); Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The 
Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 63 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 1, 36–37 (2010) (documenting defendants’ frequent resort to event studies in 
establishing “negative causation” under Section 11(e) of the Securities Act). 
80 See, e.g., New Eng. Health Care Emp. Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, 234 
F.R.D. 627, 634–35 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (finding that a “significant component” in plain-
tiffs’ reimbursable expenses of more than two million dollars (not including attorneys’ 
fees) “was the cost of experts and consultants”); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability 
for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 306–07 
(including the high cost of experts among the factors that raise the social cost of secu-
rities fraud litigation). 
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incurring this cost will exert deterrent effects on the primary be-
havior of affected parties.81 
A second source of the litigation-cost asymmetry concerns access 
to legal counsel and representation. Certain litigants have cheaper 
access to legal representation than others. Corporations and repeat 
litigants often pay retainer fees or employ in-house lawyers. Their 
adversaries, on the other hand, especially when they are private in-
dividuals, must expend considerably higher amounts of money and 
effort to secure adequate legal representation. First, they have to 
incur search and verification costs to ensure adequate representa-
tion. Second, they will be subject to hourly billing. 
The cost advantage of repeat litigants is not based on volume 
alone, however. Such parties can often take advantage of econo-
mies of scale and scope that further lower their cost. A firm that 
faces multiple legal disputes can hire attorneys who will specialize 
in representing it after acquiring expertise in the relevant litigation 
areas. These attorneys will develop standard litigation methods 
that will maximize the firm’s chances to prevail in court. Those 
methods may include repeated engagement of experts, document 
reviewers, and other specialists. These specialists, too, will set up 
working protocols that will apply in every case and help the firm 
achieve the best possible results. This litigation machinery will 
spread the firm’s one-time investment in the dispute resolution 
across many cases. Consequently, the firm’s expenditure on every 
individual case will steadily decline. 
To illustrate, consider a company that holds a large portfolio of 
patents like IBM or an insurance company like AIG. Many of the 
legal disputes in which such companies are involved will share nu-
merous common characteristics. Those commonalities allow such 
companies to rely on past cases in litigating new ones. The pres-
ence of recurring elements considerably lowers learning and draft-
81 See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of 
Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (2010) (describing how the 
quest for favorable evidence affects—and oftentimes distorts—a party’s primary be-
havior); see also Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof 
Burdens, 37 J. Legal Stud. 273, 276–80 (2008) (showing how allocation of proof bur-
dens can affect the cost and direction of underlying primary activity); Robert E. Scott 
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 
858–70 (2006) (showing how default and contractual allocations-of-proof burdens can 
improve performance of contractual obligations). 
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ing costs, as well as the cost of legal research. First-time litigants 
and their representatives must, of course, do everything from 
scratch. 
Asymmetry in the parties’ litigation costs is not a rare spectacle 
in our legal system. In fact, such cases are ubiquitous. When 
asymmetrical litigation costs occur randomly in our legal system, 
they do not present a serious cause for concern. However, when 
they systematically favor one group of litigants over another, they 
can result in erosion of entitlements. The reason is simple and dis-
turbing at once: the party who holds a cost advantage can always 
induce her adversary to forego litigation and succumb to a settle-
ment offer even when the law is on her side. A simple numerical 
example can demonstrate this point. Take a firm whose litigation 
cost is $1000 per case and pit it against an individual entitlement 
holder whose parallel expenditure is $5000. Under this recurrent 
scenario, the entitlement holder will be willing to avoid litigation—
no matter how successful it promises to be, as far as merits are con-
cerned—by paying the firm any sum up to $5000. And if the enti-
tlement holder values her entitlement below $5000, she will sur-
render to the firm’s pressure and forfeit her entitlement altogether, 
as did Anne in our introductory example.82 
This decision of the entitlement holder is rational. Indeed, it is 
the only rational decision she can make. The firm’s threat of going 
to court, given its low litigation cost, is credible. As a consequence 
of this threat, the entitlement holder stands to lose $5000. Hence, it 
is only rational for her to remove the threat by paying the firm any 
ransom amount below $5000.83 
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss three representative 
cases. We extract those cases from three diverse areas: intellectual 
property, insurance, and criminal law. 
A. Intellectual Property 
The field of intellectual property is rife with examples of how 
asymmetrical litigation costs can lead to the erosion of entitle-
82 See supra note 32. 
83 From the entitlement holder’s point of view, going to court will only be rational in 
a rather unusual scenario in which she values her satisfaction from vindicating her en-
titlement at more than $5000. 
PARCHOMOVSKY_STEIN_BOOK 9/11/2012 8:26 PM 
1346 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:1313 
 
ments. Begin with copyright law. Many creative industries are 
highly centralized. The rights to the vast majority of musical works 
and films are held by a relatively small number of corporations. 
Furthermore, the field is characterized by central enforcement 
agencies—such as the American Society of Composers, Authors 
and Publishers (“ASCAP”), the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”), and the Motion Picture Association of Amer-
ica (“MPAA”)—that represent all relevant rightsholders and carry 
out their litigation initiatives.84 
Although copyright law is supposed to balance the interests of 
copyright holders against those of users, numerous scholars have 
noted that the design of copyright law is slanted in favor of copy-
right holders.85 The Copyright Act bestows very broad rights and 
powers on copyright holders, while making painstaking efforts to 
define privileges very narrowly and carefully.86 The most important 
privilege, or defense, the Act grants to users is fair use. Fair use is 
supposed to be the bastion of users’ rights and the most important 
counterweight to the broad powers of copyright owners. Unfortu-
nately, fair use, on account of its complex design, has won itself the 
84 Recently, a private company made itself an assignee of multiple copyrights solely 
for the purpose of filing suits against alleged infringers and profiting from those suits 
by utilizing economies of scale. The company had no standing to file those suits, as 
only the legal or beneficial copyright owner can sue for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106, 501(b) (2006); Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc). For that reason, presumably, the company did not disclose its as-
signee status and the copyright owner’s identity in two hundred actions for copyright 
infringement. The court dismissed the company from the case and ordered it to show 
cause why it should not be sanctioned for egregious litigation behavior. Righthaven 
LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 978–79 (D. Nev. 2011). 
85 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1509–
16 (2009) and sources cited therein. 
86 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 54–80 (2008) (criticizing 
“copyright’s ungainly expansion”); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: 
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
354, 354–60 (1999) (criticizing the “enclosure movement” in copyright law: the current 
tendency to outlaw uses of expressive works that were previously considered legiti-
mate); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 587, 587 (2008) 
(attesting that rights granted by copyright law underwent extraordinary expansion 
over the past fifty years); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform 
and the Law/Norm Gap, 3 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543–48 (2007) (observing that copyright 
protection and liability for copyright infringement are excessive); Pamela Samuelson, 
The Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134, 134 (describing the enclosure dynamic 
as “the copyright grab”). See generally Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copy-
wrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity (2001).  
PARCHOMOVSKY_STEIN_BOOK 9/11/2012 8:26 PM 
2012] The Relational Contingency of Rights 1347 
 
dubious distinction of being the “most troublesome [doctrine] in 
the whole law of copyright.”87 As one of us, together with Professor 
Philip Weiser, observed, fair use’s ability to shield unauthorized 
users of works is greatly undermined by the uncertainty that has 
become the hallmark of the doctrine.88 Furthermore, as Professor 
James Gibson pointed out, the design of our copyright system al-
lows copyright holders to expand their dominion at users’ ex-
pense.89 Specifically, the vagueness and consequent uncertainty of 
fair use and other defenses prompt users to pay copyright owners 
license fees rather than risk litigation.90 This dynamic leads to ac-
cretion of rights by copyright owners.91 
But the vagueness of the fair use doctrine is only the beginning 
of the story. All copyright infringement actions share many basic 
characteristics. To succeed in an infringement suit, a copyright 
holder essentially needs to show ownership of a valid copyright and 
infringement by the alleged defendant. She then has to specify the 
remedies she requests. This is a common pattern in most copyright 
infringement suits. As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys who represent 
clients with large copyright portfolios face a downward sloping cost 
curve. This means that up to a certain number of cases, the cost of 
instituting each additional infringement suit will be lower than the 
cost of bringing the previous suit. Ultimately, the cost curve will 
flatten out, but even then the relative cost of litigation for plain-
tiffs’ attorneys will be much lower than it is for defendants’ attor-
neys. 
 
87 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
88 Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 
91, 100 (2010) (“The standard’s vagueness prevents actors from discerning the opti-
mal behavior that the law requires of them.”). 
89 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 884 (2007). 
90 Id. at 884, 887. 
91 Id. at 884. But see Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 333, 360–61 (2012) (arguing based on the prospect theory that uncer-
tainty of users’ liability stimulates use of copyrighted works as people generally prefer 
uncertain losses over certain ones). 
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The use of central enforcement organizations not only lowers 
the infringement-detection cost for copyright owners;92 it also guar-
antees them an inherent advantage in court. Enforcement organi-
zations are repeat players in the copyright arena. As such, they can 
produce “cease and desist” letters and court briefs at a much lower 
cost than their adversaries, and then leverage this advantage into a 
favorable settlement. These settlements economize on litigation 
costs, but they also stunt the development of fair-use, misuse, and 
other copyright defenses, as courts are increasingly denied the op-
portunity to consider these defenses. A corollary cost of this dy-
namic is that it sweeps problems under the rug and thereby pre-
vents policymakers from adopting corrective measures. After all, 
disputes that have been settled privately between the parties rarely 
make policymakers’ “to do” list. 
Importantly, the cost advantage enjoyed by owners of large 
copyright portfolios has a profound effect on their primary behav-
ior. First, it induces owners to create and acquire large portfolios of 
copyrighted works. For instance, Getty Images, Inc. recently ac-
quired Flickr’s entire collection of images. Following this acquisi-
tion, Getty established an international network of enforcement 
agencies and started asserting its rights against users of digital pho-
tos all over the world.93 This strategic move is consistent with our 
analysis, but it is not necessarily disconcerting. Second and much 
more troubling, certain corporations and individual actors report-
edly adopted a “business model” under which they wait for certain 
works to become “viral,” or in ordinary parlance, enjoy wide dis-
tribution over the Internet. Works typically attain this status due to 
the fact that they are initially distributed freely, often under per-
mission from the original creators. At this point, profit-driven ac-
tors, typically corporations, acquire the rights to the works and 
launch an aggressive enforcement attack against unsuspecting 
92 See Stanley M. Besen, Sheila N. Kirby & Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Collectives, 78 Va. L. Rev. 383, 390 (1992) (explaining how copyright 
collectives economize on monitoring and collection costs). 
93 See Wendy M. Grossman, Is a Picture Really Worth £1,000?, The Guardian, Nov. 
27, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/nov/27/internet-
photography (same strategy used by a large picture company). 
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Internet users.94 The companies’ cost advantage in litigation secures 
the attack’s success in virtually every case.95 
Strategic abuse of intellectual property rights is by no means re-
stricted to the area of copyright. Holders of large patent portfolios 
enjoy the same cost advantage in litigation, as do owners of sizable 
copyright pools. In the world of patents, the advantage may be 
even more pronounced. A patent portfolio will often contain mul-
tiple individual patents that cover different aspects of the given 
technology or product. Due to this fact, a portfolio holder will of-
ten be able to make several infringement claims against its rival. 
Each additional claim will widen the parties’ litigation cost differ-
ential, thereby dramatically increasing the defendants’ motivation 
to settle. 
In the patent context, large portfolios can help their owners 
avoid costly litigation, “serving to dissuade litigation (and threats 
thereof) by others in the field, because of the threat (real or im-
plied) of retaliatory litigation.”96 As Professor Polk Wagner and 
one of us pointed out, “the scale-effects of a portfolio mean that 
the broader array of possible infringement claims (and the con-
comitant greater net likelihood of success) allow significant patent 
portfolios to serve as important defensive mechanisms in a highly 
litigious environment.”97 This dynamic has an important implica-
tion: inventors whose patents are infringed by holders of large 
94 See, e.g., Michelle Castillo, Law Firm Finds Success Targeting Those Who Post 
Copyrighted Images, Time Techland, Feb. 9, 2011, http://techland.time.com/
2011/02/09/law-firm-finds-success-targeting-those-who-post-copyrighted-images/ (de-
scribing a law firm whose strategy is to “[b]uy out the copyrights for viral content and 
then sue bloggers and other people who violate copyright by reposting those images” 
and reporting that the firm’s annual profits from these suits exceed $300,000); Alison 
Frankel, Porn Copyright Troll Targets Strike Back in New Class Action, Reuters, July 
6, 2012, http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/07/06/porn-copyright-troll-targets-
strike-back-in-new-class-action/ (reporting that a company pressured thousands of 
users of the Internet into settlement payments after accusing them of unpermitted 
downloading of its copyrighted porn materials and that a class action was filed to fend 
off this practice and reimburse victims). 
95 Indeed, as Professor Jason Mazzone recently demonstrated, copyright owners of-
tentimes exploit their strategic advantage by filing suits for remedies they do not law-
fully deserve. See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law (2011).  
96 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 
36 (2005). 
97 Id. 
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portfolios will choose not to sue them at all in order not to expose 
themselves to the risk of a retaliatory counter-suit which they can 
ill-afford.98 
The abuse of cost advantages is not confined to large corpora-
tions. Consider the phenomenon of “patent trolling,” the practice 
of holding patents solely for the purpose of extracting payments 
from others, without ever intending to commercialize the underly-
ing invention. Jerome Lemelson, whose name is often mentioned 
in this context, amassed about six hundred patents during his life-
time and frequently asserted them against various corporations. He 
became famous in part for suing Japanese and European corpora-
tions for infringing his machine-vision patents. The merits of these 
suits are subject to a heated debate to this day.99 Yet the foreign 
corporations chose to settle the suits for $100 million. Their deci-
sion to settle was driven in part by the fear of an unfavorable out-
come in court.100 But Lemelson also enjoyed a substantial cost ad-
vantage over his opponents, as he could litigate more cheaply, and 
this advantage also helped him to extract the settlements. 
Strategic litigation threats also pervade the domain of trademark 
law. The relative advantage in litigation costs enjoyed by large cor-
porations enables them continuously to expand the scope of trade-
mark protection at the expense of small businesses that can ill-
afford to protect their rights in lengthy court battles. For example, 
Adidas, who owns the famous three-stripe mark, can assert its 
rights against smaller competitors who produce shoes whose de-
signs incorporate two or four stripes, demanding that they cease 
producing and marketing their shoes even when the shoes’ overall 
design is different and consumer confusion is highly unlikely. Over 
98 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic Use of Patents: Implica-
tions for Antitrust, in Antitrust, Patents and Copyright: EU and US Perspectives 85, 
90 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005) (observing that large patent 
holders pay reduced legal fees, which allows them to use litigation warfare to their 
advantage). 
99 See Adam Goldman, Some Claim Inventor Lemelson a Fraud, USA Today, Aug. 
21, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/discoveries/2005-08-21-
lemelson-fraud_x.htm. 
100 Id.; see also Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, Wall St. J., July 8, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577514782932390996.html 
(reporting proliferation of a business model that involves large corporations acquiring 
hefty patent portfolios and aggressively suing ostensible infringers in order to extort 
licensing fees). 
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time, this strategy can yield Adidas a near monopoly over the in-
corporation of stripes into the design of shoes and apparel.101 
Strategic assertion of trademarks is a broad phenomenon that 
encompasses all industries. This strategy characterizes large corpo-
rations and its typical victims are smaller businesses that dare to 
compete with the corporation. In a recent article, Professor Leah 
Chan Grinvald aptly called this practice “trademark bullying.”102 
Based on empirical evidence, she reported that 
 Large corporations send out multitudes of letters demanding 
small businesses or individuals cease and desist in their use of a 
trademark that has some resemblance to a large corporation’s 
trademark(s). On many occasions, these letters appear to be sent 
out without any analysis of the purported infringement. These 
letters seem intended to simply intimidate the small business or 
individual into forgoing the use and/or registration of their trade-
mark.103 
These letters are so effective that recipients often choose to sur-
render their trademark entitlements or alter their marks without 
legal battle. These surrenders are particularly troubling in view of 
the high costs of a business’s rebranding and readvertising. Profes-
sor Grinvald suggests that the source of the problem is that “vic-
tims do not have the wherewithal to fight legal battles.”104 While we 
do not mean to underestimate the effect of wealth constraints on 
actors’ decisions, we posit that asymmetrical litigation costs are 
101 Professor Kevin Greene was the first to note this problem in the context of the 
entertainment industry. K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredi-
ble Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertain-
ment Media and Cyberspace, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 609 (2004). He expressed 
concern about corporations’ abusive litigation strategies, while underscoring that the 
“effectiveness of lawsuits to silence corporate critics derives in part from the disparity 
of resources between the plaintiff corporation and the defendant parody artist.” Id. at 
632–33 (quoting Sarah Mayhew Schlosser, Note, The High Price of (Criticizing) Cof-
fee: The Chilling Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody, 
43 Ariz. L. Rev. 931, 948 (2001)). 
102 Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 625, 625–26. 
103 Id. at 628. Professor Grinvald further reports that the threatening letters are ex-
tremely effective: their recipients are business owners who are not trained in the law; 
the letters are often “written in legalese” and cite “court cases that may or may not be 
relevant”; and they also give their recipients an “extremely short time-frame for a re-
sponse.” Id. at 628–29. 
104 Id. at 629. 
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equally responsible for the loss of the trademark rights of small 
businesses. As we explained in Part II, an entitlement’s vitality 
does not depend solely on the cost of defending it in court, but also 
on how much it will cost the denier to attack it. 
 
B. Insurance 
Insurance companies enjoy substantial economies of scale and 
scope in litigation. These economies stem from the companies’ 
business organization and litigation setup. As far as the former is 
concerned, the companies systematically assemble and pool to-
gether information concerning the probability and the magnitude 
of the damages they insure against. The companies also elicit rele-
vant personal data from the insured and develop standardized ways 
of juxtaposing the two sets of information—statistical and per-
sonal—against each other. This juxtaposition enables the compa-
nies to formulate and price the different policies they offer to indi-
viduals and organizations seeking to buy insurance and, 
subsequently, to assess the validity of policyholders’ indemnifica-
tion claims.105 
The companies’ litigation setup is equally standardized. By and 
large, it features policyholders who sue the company in court for 
failure to indemnify. Each of those plaintiffs complains that the 
company refuses to pay her for the damage that the policy she 
bought from it is supposed to cover. Some of those suits have 
merit, while others are unmeritorious or downright fraudulent. To 
defend against these multiple suits that have a virtually identical 
pattern, the companies retain (or employ) attorneys specializing in 
insurance law. To provide insurance companies with proper repre-
sentation, those attorneys need to make a one-time investment: 
they need to study the standard terms of the relevant insurance 
policies and the information already assembled by the company. 
The attorneys also need to set up routine methods and protocols 
105 See Emmett J. Vaughan & Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insur-
ance 35–40, 87–90, 130–38 (10th ed. 2008) (explaining how insurance companies 
gather, pool, and evaluate information pertaining to risks they insure against). 
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for working with actuaries, private investigators and other ex-
perts.106 
The resulting economies of scale and scope are enormous. They 
allow the company not only to take advantage of being a coveted 
client on an intensely competitive market for attorney services, but 
also to spread the cost of its representation and all other legal ex-
penses across a very large number of cases. This cost-saving capac-
ity gives the company litigation power that their policyholders can-
not match. Any such policyholder, either rich or poor, will have to 
pay her attorney considerably more than what the company will 
expend on defending against the suit. The cost differential separat-
ing the two parties is vast, and so is the company’s opportunity to 
drive the policyholder into an unfavorable settlement that will ef-
fectively obliterate her entitlements under the policy and insurance 
law. By seizing upon this opportunity, the company will systemati-
cally underpay its insured and profit at their expense. 
Insurance companies also have a potentially legitimate reason 
for underpaying policyholders’ indemnification claims. Many poli-
cyholders falsely exaggerate their losses, and it is not always easy 
for the company to detect such frauds. The company will conse-
quently do well to factor in the possibility of fraud into its claim 
decisions and subsequent settlement offers. Under this framework, 
any indemnification claim that fits into the company’s “suspicious” 
profile will be marked out as potentially fraudulent in calculating 
the company’s claim-resolution proposal. By doing so, the com-
pany will reduce its payout to policyholders and deter fraudulent 
claims. Hence, systematic underpayment of claims might also be an 
economically optimal strategy for insurance companies.107 
For good or bad reasons, insurance companies take advantage of 
their superior cost-differential by underpaying policyholders’ 
106 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions, 
40 J. Legal Stud. 205, 221 (2011) (noting that “the very largest attorney firms . . . enjoy 
the greatest expertise and economies of scale in bringing a securities class action”); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 Stan. J.L. 
Bus. & Fin. 486, 494 (2007) (specifying economies of scale and scope of transactional 
lawyers). 
107 See Keith J. Crocker & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims 
Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & Econ. 469, 469 (2002) (identifying optimality condi-
tions for insurers’ underpayments and furnishing empirical proof of systematic under-
payments of injury claims arising from car accidents). 
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claims. This practice is well-documented in academic literature108 
and has given rise to suits filed by the government and consumer 
protection groups.109 The New Mexico Supreme Court decision in 
Truong v. Allstate Insurance Co.110 provides both a recent and a re-
markable illustration of those suits.111 This decision examined 
Allstate’s use of a claim-processing computer software, pro-
grammed to undervalue and underpay policyholders’ claims below 
their true value, against the state’s prohibition of “[u]nfair or de-
ceptive and unconscionable trade practices.”112 The court rejected 
Allstate’s claim that its software fell under the “market conduct 
examination” permitted by a supervising agency (the Public Regu-
lation Commission’s Superintendent of Insurance). The court rea-
soned that such permission can only be granted expressly and for-
mally, rather than implicitly, and reinstated the policyholders’ class 
action.113 
Another good example is Louisiana’s parens patriae action 
against Allstate, its provider of statistical, actuarial, and underwrit-
ing information, and the manufacturers of computer programs ma-
nipulated to reduce the value of policyholders’ claims.114 The 
108 See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims 
Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1395, 1430–31 (1994) (ar-
guing on empirical grounds that “insurance companies . . . engage in strategic behav-
ior with claimants” and systematically underpay claims); Leon E. Trakman, David 
Meets Goliath: Consumers Unite Against Big Business, 25 Seton Hall L. Rev. 617, 
623 (1994) (“Insurance companies consistently underpay valid insurance claims to 
horde the difference between the amount due to each insured and the amount actu-
ally paid.”). 
109 This form of subsidized litigation is among our proposed solutions of the unre-
alizability problem. See infra Section IV.C. 
110 227 P.3d 73 (N.M. 2010). 
111 For additional examples, see, e.g., Kelsey D. Dulin, Comment, The Disaster Af-
ter the Disaster: Insurance Companies’ Post-Catastrophe Claims Handling Practices, 
61 Okla. L. Rev. 189, 191–92, 196–206 (2008) (explaining and illustrating how insur-
ance companies take advantage of catastrophe victims and underpay claims); see also 
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313, 1322–23 (Ariz. 1988) 
(admitting into evidence an insurer’s statements in settlement negotiations to show 
that it attempted to strong-arm the policyholder into a cheap settlement). 
112 See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-3 to -10 (2011) (prohibiting and making actionable 
“[u]nfair or deceptive trade practices and unconscionable trade practices in the con-
duct of any trade or commerce”). 
113 Truong, 227 P.3d at 84–89. 
114 Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 421–22 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit categorized 
this action as an equivalent of a “class” or “mass” action115 for pur-
poses of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.116 Based on this 
categorization, the court found “minimal diversity” between 
Allstate and the individuals represented by Louisiana’s Attorney 
General117 and removed the action to federal court pursuant to the 
Act’s provisions.118 
These decisions raise both important and interesting questions 
of law that merit an independent discussion.119 However, they are 
discussed here for a different reason. These decisions show how 
prevalent the insurance companies’ underpayment strategies are 
and how hard it is for an individual policyholder facing those 
strategies to stand her ground.120 Indeed, it is no coincidence that 
one of those decisions involved a class action and another a parens 
patriae suit. Absent proactive mechanisms that level the playfield 
between insurance companies and insured,121 the companies will 
use their cost advantage to force the insured to forego the vindica-
tion of their rights in court and accept instead a cheap out-of-court 
settlement. The contractual rights of policyholders will conse-
quently become mute. 
C. Criminal Law 
Asymmetrical litigation costs can foil criminal justice as well. 
Consider a prosecutor who accuses numerous defendants of unli-
censed work as contractors—a misdemeanor punishable by a fine 
not exceeding $5000.122 The prosecutor is one of several attorneys 
115 Id. at 430. 
116 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)). 
117 Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 430. 
118 Id. at 423, 430. 
119 See, e.g., Dwight R. Carswell, Comment, CAFA and Parens Patriae Actions, 78 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 353–57 (2011) (discussing the Caldwell decision). 
120 See, e.g., David Dietz & Darrell Preston, Home Insurers’ Secret Tactics Cheat 
Fire Victims, Hike Profits, Bloomberg, Aug. 3, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=21070001&sid=aIOpZROwhvNI (observing that insurance companies sys-
tematically underpay claims and providing examples). 
121 We discuss these mechanisms in Part IV below. 
122 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7028(a), (b) (West 2012) (providing that unli-
censed work as a contractor is a misdemeanor punishable upon first conviction “by a 
fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) or by imprisonment in a county jail 
not exceeding six months, or by both that fine and imprisonment”). 
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on the government’s payroll who specialize in prosecuting licensing 
violations. To be able to perform her job properly, the prosecutor 
had acquired the requisite legal and technical knowledge, which 
she employs in all cases she handles. The state can, consequently, 
prosecute contractors suspected of doing unlicensed work at a rela-
tively low cost. For reasons we already explained, the state’s cost of 
prosecuting every additional contractor gets lower relative to the 
cost of previous prosecutions. Any addition to the prosecutors’ 
caseload spreads their effort across greater numbers of cases. Up to 
a certain point, it also helps prosecutors acquire experience and 
improve their efficiency, thus driving the state’s costs further 
down.123 
These economies of scale are one-sided. The prosecutor, for ex-
ample, does not have to put much effort into prosecuting a general 
contractor for doing unlicensed electrical work. She knows from 
her and her colleagues’ experience what electrical work is included 
in the general contractors’ license. The contractor’s attorney, on 
the other hand, will normally have to investigate this issue anew. 
The attorney will also have to familiarize himself with the relevant 
statutory and regulatory provisions, some of which are complex 
and not easy to understand. Consequently, in this and many other 
criminal cases, the gap between the cost of defense and the cost of 
prosecution is substantial. 
Assume that the state’s cost of prosecuting a contractor for do-
ing unlicensed work is $2000, while the cost of defense is typically 
$10,000 per case. The prosecutor offers each defendant to plead 
guilty and receive a $3000 fine. Under these circumstances, all de-
fendants, including those who are innocent, will do well to accept 
the prosecutor’s offer. 
Why would an innocent defendant accept this offer? The reason 
is simple: the defendant’s conviction and punishment are costly but 
still cheaper than the defense. Even when the defendant’s trial is 
completely risk-free—so that his acquittal at the end of the trial is 
guaranteed—he is still better off paying the state a fine of $3000 
123 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 
393 (2007) (noting that prosecutors, as repeat players, “can achieve economies of 
scale . . . by coordinating, channeling and settling cases . . . in the shadow of strict sen-
tencing rules that routinize outcomes”). 
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than paying an attorney a $10,000 fee.124 The innocent defendant 
will consequently choose to accept the plea bargain. Contrary to 
some scholars’ belief,125 the defendant’s gain from the plea bargain 
does not fully account for this decision. His additional—and, in-
deed, dominant—reason for accepting the bargain is the prosecu-
tor’s cost advantage that lends credibility to her threat to litigate 
the case.126 Had the prosecutor’s litigation cost been equal to the 
124 Cf. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 703 (2002) (“[I]n some 
cases defendants who might be acquitted after trial plead guilty to relatively minor 
offenses because the cost of defense exceeds seemingly minimal penalties and conse-
quences.”). 
125 See, e.g., id. 
126 Importantly, the defendant in our example cannot obtain legal representation at 
the state’s expense. Because he is not poor, he is not entitled to a state-funded attor-
ney under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). More crucially, Gideon entitles 
an indigent defendant to be represented by counsel at the government’s expense only 
when he stands to receive prison sentence upon conviction. Hence, even if our defen-
dant were poor, he would still be ineligible for Gideon’s protection as in the event of 
conviction he will only be fined rather than go to jail. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 
367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that only actual imprisonment prospect makes an indi-
gent defendant eligible for Gideon protection). Note that a defendant’s eligibility for 
a state-funded counsel under Gideon does not level the playfield. Criminal defense 
requires expert assistance and testimony in a variety of areas ranging from DNA and 
forensics to corporate accounting. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right 
to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305, 
1307–10 (2004). Under extant doctrine, an indigent defendant can receive expert as-
sistance at the government’s expense only upon showing of necessity. See Criminal 
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2006) (entitling an indigent defendant 
to government-funded expert assistance when “necessary for adequate representa-
tion”); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 444–45 (1992) (interpreting Ake v. Okla-
homa as “an expansion of earlier due process cases holding that an indigent criminal 
defendant is entitled to the minimum assistance necessary to assure him ‘a fair oppor-
tunity to present his defense’ and ‘to participate meaningfully in [the] judicial pro-
ceeding.’” (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985)); Ake, 470 U.S. at 76, 
79–85; see also Giannelli, supra, at 1336, 1380–81 (attesting that courts use “necessity” 
and “particularized need” as governing standards and that “[i]t is not clear that these 
two formulations differ in result.”); David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 
2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 7, 75–77 (proposing to expand the Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion right to enable defendants to challenge prosecution’s forensic evidence with the 
help of court-appointed experts); cf. Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1185 
(Pa. 2006) (noting, in relation to expensive computer-generated animation that prose-
cution adduced as evidence of guilt, that defendant’s financial inability to acquire 
computer-generated animation for exculpatory purposes weighs against admissibil-
ity). 
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defendant’s, it would be much harder for her to threaten the de-
fendant that she would take the case to court.127 
Another factor that widens the gap between prosecutors’ and 
defendants’ litigation costs is the parties’ unequal access to expert 
assistance. As attested by Professor Paul Giannelli in his compre-
hensive study of this area, “prosecutors . . . have an overwhelming 
advantage when compared to defense counsel.”128 Prosecutors can 
obtain expert assistance in virtually every case from government 
crime laboratories, both state and federal, and by relying on ex-
perts working in coroner and medical examiner offices, as well as 
federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Food and Drug Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.129 The enormous pool of 
government-employed experts is a perfect combination of scale 
and scope economies. This pool allows prosecutors to obtain ex-
pert assistance both cheaply and easily. Defendants have no free 
access to this, or a comparable pool, of experts.130 Consequently, 
they have to shop for their own experts and pay full market prices 
for expert services—something that only wealthy defendants can 
afford.131 
In our illustration, the prosecutor’s cost advantage enabled her 
to force an innocent defendant into a guilty plea followed by fine. 
Unscrupulous prosecutors, however, can go much further by abus-
ing their cost advantage. They can put financial pressure on defen-
dants to extort guilty pleas that will lead to a prison sentence. For 
example, a prosecutor can inflate the indictment by accusing the 
defendant of multiple crimes that include conspiracy and other in-
choate offences.132 The high cost of defending against multiple ac-
127 The defendant’s difficulty is compounded by an agency problem. If the prosecu-
tor were to spend her own money on prosecuting the case, she would likely not prose-
cute the defendant. However, since she is an agent of the state that uses public money 
under imperfect oversight of her superiors, she can afford prosecuting cases even 
when doing so is not cost-efficient. 
128 See Giannelli, supra note 126, at 1331. 
129 Id. at 1327–31. 
130 Id. at 1332. 
131 Id. 
132 See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1237, 1254 (2008) (discussing strategic “horizontal overcharg-
ing,” the widespread prosecutorial practice of charging defendants with multiple 
counts of the same or similar offense(s) when a criminal can be properly penalized by 
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cusations and the credibility of the prosecutor’s threat to go to trial 
may force innocent defendants to plead guilty. To be sure, prosecu-
tors’ cost advantage is not the only factor that gives them the upper 
hand in plea bargain negotiations. Other factors contributing to 
this imbalance are defendants’ aversion to risk and uncertainty,133 
financial constraints,134 bounded rationality,135 and prosecutors and 
defense attorneys’ self-seeking motivations.136 Yet, prosecutors’ 
cost advantage is a key element in their ability to extract guilty 
pleas from defendants. Unlike other factors that drive plea bar-
gaining, the prosecution’s cost advantage may lead to the silencing 
of entire categories of defendants who are accused of relatively 
minor violations in the sense that their voices will not be heard in 
the courtroom and their defense claims will never be given full 
consideration. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
In this Part of the Article, we propose several approaches that 
can potentially ameliorate the deleterious effect of asymmetrical 
litigation costs on entitlement. In theory, the solution is quite sim-
ple: it is necessary to level the legal playfield. This can be achieved 
either by raising litigation costs for parties who currently enjoy a 
cost advantage or by lowering litigation costs for disadvantaged 
parties.137 However, this is easier said than done. As is often the 
case, the devil is in the details138 and there are no simple prophylac-
tic solutions. 
a single count); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court 
Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 367, 464 (2010) (attesting that prosecutors file multiple-count charges to 
achieve higher sentences). 
133 See generally Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal 
Process, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495 (2006) (explaining and illustrating criminal de-
fendants’ aversion toward risk and ambiguity). 
134 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 124, at 703. 
135 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2464, 2496–527 (2004). 
136 Id. at 2470–86. 
137 Cf. Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 
303, 306–07 (1988) (advocating imposition of limits on parties’ ability to litigate as a 
means for achieving equal distribution of legal resources). 
138 Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 782, 782–83 
(2011) (analyzing one-way attorneys’ fee shifts and damage multipliers that function 
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Not every case in which one of the parties enjoys a cost advan-
tage calls for leveling the playfield.139 In almost all cases, one of the 
parties has this advantage and the adoption of broad policies that 
seek to negate it would be both wasteful and futile. The cost of the 
fix may far outweigh the benefit. What is more, the fact that one of 
the parties enjoys a cost advantage is not a real concern as long as 
she does not seek to use it strategically. This can be most easily 
seen in the context of criminal prosecution. When the government 
prosecutes a person who clearly committed a crime, making the 
process more costly for the government only for the sake of level-
ing the playfield would work to society’s detriment without produc-
ing any offsetting benefits. 
The main challenge, therefore, is to fashion legal mechanisms 
that are capable of distinguishing strategic litigants from non-
strategic ones. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss a num-
as special incentives to file suits in federal courts and expressing doubts about their 
efficacy on the ground as judges react negatively to increased caseload). 
139 In appropriate cases, pooling rightsholders into a class action will allow them to 
realize their entitlements. This pooling, however, is only possible when the right-
sholders’ suits exhibit commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Even then, the class at-
torney’s self-seeking conduct (e.g., a collusive settlement with the defendant) might 
lead to the entitlements’ erosion. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Ac-
countability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 370 (2000) (analyzing agency costs in class actions and ways to reduce 
those costs). Under certain conditions, state attorneys general and federal regulatory 
agencies may decide to seek legal redress for aggrieved citizens. These conditions 
typically include commonality of suits and presence of a strong public interest in 
prosecuting those suits. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate 
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623 
(2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 500, 518–39 
(2011). Even then, there will be no alignment between the agencies’ and the attor-
neys’ general goals and the interests of the citizens they represent. For a superb analy-
sis of this misalignment and its policy implications, see Margaret H. Lemos, Aggre-
gate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 
Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association); see also Zimmerman, supra, at 541–53 (identifying agen-
cies’ limitations as protectors of individual rights). A class action still appears to be an 
economically superior solution for common question suits. See David Rosenberg & 
Kathryn E. Spier, On Structural Bias in the Litigation of Common Question Claims 
(June 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950196) 
(identifying a structural bias in non-unified common question litigation: while each 
plaintiff invests in the litigation to promote his own case, the defendant spends to de-
feat all plaintiffs); see also David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The 
Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 831–33 (2002) (arguing that 
mandatory class action enhances social welfare). 
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ber of mechanisms that may be used to accomplish this task. Spe-
cifically, we will consider the options of increased court fees, fee-
shifting rules, subsidization of disadvantaged litigants, and the in-
tensified use of punitive damages, “bad faith,” “unclean hands” 
and other equitable doctrines. We will assess these mechanisms’ 
strengths and weaknesses and will try to rank them on the basis of 
this assessment. 
A. Increasing Court Fees 
The first remedial option we wish to consider is stricter ex ante 
screens that would make it more difficult for strategic litigants to 
file suits against disadvantaged defendants. The most conventional 
mechanism that may be employed toward this end is differential 
court fees that correlate with the number of suits one files. Under 
this mechanism, court fees will increase progressively with every 
additional lawsuit filed by a litigant suspected of being strategic. 
Serial litigants consequently will have to pay an increasingly high 
fee for each additional suit they file. 
Rising court fees will increase litigation costs for serial litigants 
(both strategic and honest). The fee increments will gradually 
eliminate the serial litigants’ cost advantage, which, in turn, will 
take away their ability to threaten potential defendants with suits. 
Note that strategic plaintiffs’ capacity to extort settlements criti-
cally depends on their ability to make a credible threat to sue the 
defendant. Properly calibrated fee increases will gradually erode 
the credibility of those threats. Over time, those threats will be-
come non-credible and the litigation playfield will be leveled. 
But herein lies the main problem with the proposed mechanism. 
It takes time for it to take effect. This may appear to be a fairly in-
consequential problem at first blush. But, in fact, the opposite is 
true. The time problem dooms the mechanism. To illustrate, as-
sume that a five percent increase in court fees allows a strategic 
plaintiff to enjoy her cost advantage in the first ten suits she files, 
but not thereafter. Under the assumed rate, the plaintiff’s cost ad-
vantage disappears at the eleventh suit. Seemingly, after winning 
ten suits in a row, the plaintiff will no longer be able to destroy her 
opponents’ entitlements, and the unrealizability problem will fade 
away. 
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In fact, it will not. The reason is simple: defendants one through 
ten will not litigate their cases. No reasonable person will agree to 
be among the first ten defendants to go to court. Instead, a reason-
able person will prefer to settle the case by giving up her entitle-
ment (or part of it). The next defendants will follow suit, thereby 
completely exempting the plaintiff from the duty to pay court fees. 
The fee-increase mechanism is therefore unlikely to remedy the 
problem. 
The increased fees solution also raises fairness and efficiency 
concerns. As we already noted, not all serial litigants are strategic. 
Some of them are honest rightsholders who suffered multiple in-
fringements of their rights, as is often the case with owners of copy-
right in musical works. Raising court fees for those litigants up the 
point of unaffordability would block their access to courts and al-
low infringers to misappropriate their works. This outcome is nei-
ther fair nor efficient. 
The increased fees solution is also partial by design. This solu-
tion only works with strategic plaintiffs, but not with strategic de-
fendants, as defendants pay no court fees. Moreover, a strategic 
litigant can often choose between being a plaintiff and being a de-
fendant. Consider a landowner who tries to void her neighbor’s 
right-to-way easement. Instead of filing a suit to void the easement, 
the landowner can conveniently turn herself into a fee-exempted 
defendant by destroying and occupying the pathway in question. If 
this action triggers the neighbor’s suit, the landowner will realize 
her cost-advantage and obliterate the neighbor’s entitlement with-
out paying court fees. If the neighbor decides not to sue, the land-
owner will prevail without a fight. 
Finally, the increased-fee mechanism can only work in civil liti-
gation. In the context of criminal prosecutions, this mechanism is 
inapplicable. Once it becomes effective, it will stop the criminal 
justice system dead in its tracks, as it will prevent the government 
from prosecuting offenders. 
B. Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting is a second option that policymakers may adopt in 
order to combat strategic litigants. Across the United States, each 
civil litigant pays her own court costs and attorney’s fees. This gen-
eral principle is widely known as the “American rule.” Most other 
PARCHOMOVSKY_STEIN_BOOK 9/11/2012 8:26 PM 
2012] The Relational Contingency of Rights 1363 
 
countries follow the so-called “English rule” that empowers the 
prevailing party to collect her court costs and attorney’s fees from 
the losing party. Critics of the American rule claim that it promotes 
“wasteful litigation expenditures, implausible claims, strike suits, 
onerous discovery demands, and spurious defenses.”140 Champions 
of the American rule respond to this accusation by underscoring 
access to justice. They argue in this connection that the English 
rule “deters risk-averse plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious claims, 
especially against rich defendants who can afford expensive coun-
sel.”141 Law and Economics scholars who have weighed in on the 
debate tend to favor the American rule on the ground that it best 
promotes out-of-court settlements.142 
But not all settlements are equally desirable from a social per-
spective.143 While we do not challenge the conventional wisdom 
among Law and Economics scholars as to the incentive effect of 
the American rule on settlements, our analysis casts doubt on the 
assumption that maximizing the number of out-of-court settle-
ments is necessarily a laudable goal. If our analysis is correct, not 
all settlements are socially desirable: some settlements, as Bentham 
140 Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency 
Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2154, 2154 (1992). 
141 Id. at 2155. 
142 See Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 927, 928 
(1988) (claiming that “making the losing party pay the winning party’s attorney’s fees 
would reduce, not increase, the settlement rate”); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, 
and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of 
Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55, 65–66 (1982) (arguing that there will be fewer set-
tlements under a fee-shifting regime when parties’ expected judgments are the same). 
But see John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell 
Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093 (1991). Full 
discussion of the “English Rule or American Rule?” debate is beyond the ken of this 
Article. 
143 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. Phil. & 
Pol’y 102, 114–19 (1986) (arguing that the private and often secret character of set-
tlements deprives society of the valuable information and public goods generated by 
adjudication); Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Ef-
fect of Civil Settlements, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 957, 960 (2010) (demonstrating that some 
settlements create socially undesirable benchmarks for primary behavior); Owen M. 
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075–76 (1984) (underscoring distortion-
ary effects of settlements and describing settlement as a “capitulation to the condi-
tions of mass society [that] should be neither encouraged nor praised”). 
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put it, are “repugnant to justice.”144 As we have shown, out-of-court 
settlements lead to the effacement of entitlements in certain con-
texts. After all, it is precisely the ability of parties with a cost ad-
vantage to craft settlements in a way that induces their adversaries 
to forego trial that causes the problem. Hence, the English rule 
may be desirable in the present context. 
Forcing the losing party to pay the winner her court expenses 
and attorney’s fees has the same effect as increasing court fees: it 
raises total litigation costs for strategic litigants. The two remedial 
mechanisms, however, differ from each other in four important re-
spects. First, unlike the increased court fees that acquire their re-
medial power over time, the English rule takes effect immediately 
as of the very first case. The English rule thus avoids the main 
shortcoming of the increased court fees solution. Second, while un-
der the increased court fees regime the money goes to the courts 
system, the English fee-shifting rule channels the money to success-
ful defendants. This difference increases the incentive of potential 
defendants to defend their entitlements in court. Third, a fee-
shifting mechanism is a more precise measure than increased court 
fees, as it reimburses defendants for their actual—or under most 
legal systems, reasonable—expenses. Lastly, the increased court-
fees mechanism, as we already noted, can only affect the strategic 
filing of suits. The fee-shifting mechanism is universal: its adoption 
will affect not only plaintiffs in civil cases, but also defendants and 
criminal prosecutors. For all these reasons, the English rule clearly 
outperforms increased court fees as a mechanism for combating 
strategic lawsuits. 
That said, the English rule is not a foolproof solution. This rule 
works best when the plaintiff’s case is completely without merit. 
When the plaintiff has absolutely no chance of winning the case, 
adoption of the English rule will take away the plaintiff’s ability to 
utilize her cost advantage as a means for extorting a favorable set-
144 See Jeremy Bentham, Scotch Reform; Considered, with Reference to the Plan, 
Proposed in the Late Parliament, for the Regulation of the Courts, and the Admini-
stration of Justice, in Scotland 75–76 (London, R. Taylor & Co. 1808) (describing set-
tlements as “repugnant to” and a “denial of” justice); see also Amalia D. Kessler, De-
ciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European 
Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudica-
tion, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L. 423, 438–41 (2009) (laying out an insightful historical 
account of Bentham’s opposition to settlements). 
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tlement from the defendant—at least when the defendant also 
evaluates the plaintiff’s probability of winning the case at zero. 
Under this scenario, it does not matter how significant the plain-
tiff’s cost advantage is since the defendant knows that at the end of 
the process she will be fully reimbursed for her expenses. And the 
plaintiff knows it too. The English rule thus takes away the plain-
tiff’s threat point. 
The analysis changes, however, when a strategic plaintiff’s 
chance of winning the case is not zero, but rather a small positive, 
say, thirty percent. In any such case, a strategic plaintiff will still be 
able to utilize her cost advantage to extract favorable out-of-court 
settlements from defendants. Naturally, the pool of potential tar-
gets will be smaller and the plaintiff’s settlement gains will corre-
spondingly shrink. Yet, with respect to certain defendants who 
must pay a steep price for legal representation, the cost advantage 
will be substantial enough to extort ransom payments.145 
Importantly, we do not argue that the English rule should be ap-
plied across the board simply because it does a better job of deter-
ring strategic litigation that threatens to erode entitlements. The 
position we take is far less ambitious. What we did in this Section is 
to identify a previously-unnoticed factor that weighs in favor of the 
145 Allowing defendants to file early motions to dismiss the suit and requiring courts 
to decide those motions promptly may provide a partial solution to this problem. This 
approach is followed by the Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participa-
tion) statutes, enacted by numerous states to protect citizens who petition the gov-
ernment against suits aiming to suppress their petitioning activities. Anti-SLAPP stat-
utes allow aggrieved citizens to file an early motion to dismiss the suit. This motion 
will be granted and the plaintiff will be obligated to pay the citizen’s legal fees if the 
court finds that the plaintiff sued the citizen because of her potentially meritorious 
petition to the government. See Paul D. Wilson & Noah C. Shaw, Robber Barons, 
Back-Stabbers and Extortionists: How Far Does Anti-SLAPP Protection Go?, 43 
Urb. Law. 745, 745 (2011). Notably, courts recognize the cost advantage of SLAPP 
plaintiffs as one of the main reasons for granting early dismissal and cost-shifting 
remedies. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 
190 F.3d 963, 970–71 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks 
merit, and is brought with the goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen 
party by increasing the cost of litigation to the point that the citizen party’s case will 
be weakened or abandoned, and of deterring future litigation.” (citing Wilcox v. Su-
perior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Ct. App. 1994))); see also Liberty Synergis-
tics, Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., No. CV 11-0523, 2011 WL 4974832, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
26, 2011) (acknowledging that “California has an interest in protecting its citizens 
from malicious [SLAPP], even when the only damage they suffer is the costs of litigat-
ing the underlying lawsuit”). 
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English rule. This factor may not be weighty enough to warrant the 
English rule’s adoption in all cases, but it certainly supports the 
rule’s application under appropriate circumstances that courts can 
determine on a case-by-case basis. We therefore recommend that 
courts be given a broad discretion to apply the English rule to law-
suits that have little merit and were brought by plaintiffs with an 
inherent cost advantage over the defendant. 
C. Subsidization 
The first two solutions we discussed are analogous to a tax: their 
goal is to increase litigation costs for strategic litigants. Another 
way to level the playfield is subsidization. Specifically, lawmakers 
may lower litigation costs for strategic litigants’ targets by subsidiz-
ing the latter’s litigation efforts. This result can be achieved either 
directly or indirectly. Direct subsidization consists of giving money 
to the litigants themselves. Indirect subsidization involves setting 
up legal aid organizations to represent the targets of strategic liti-
gants. 
Real world examples of direct subsidization are hard to find. In 
fact, we are not aware of any. The reason is straightforward. Direct 
subsidization presents a formidable challenge for the state in two 
respects. First, subsidizing all litigants is both impractical and inef-
ficient. Any mechanism of direct subsidization will consequently 
require the state to set up a screening mechanism for identifying 
litigants who are eligible for subsidization. The cost of operating 
such a mechanism will likely be enormous, which calls into ques-
tion the cost-effectiveness of the entire enterprise. Second, and 
equally important, a system of direct subsidization will create an 
acute moral hazard problem.146 Litigants who know that their legal 
bills would be paid by the state—in part or in full—will invest ex-
cessively in legal representation. Ex ante screening, careful though 
it may be, will not eliminate this problem since it is impossible to 
estimate upfront the precise cost of legal processes. 
In light of the inherent problems with direct subsidization, it is 
not surprising that most jurisdictions prefer the indirect subsidiza-
146 See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private 
and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1997) (discuss-
ing misalignments between private and social incentives in litigation). 
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tion route. Instead of channeling public money directly to litigants, 
states by and large prefer to institute public agencies that represent 
eligible litigants. The most common agency of this sort is the public 
defender’s office that provides legal representation to criminal de-
fendants who cannot afford an attorney.147 
The state may also set up legal aid agencies to help civil litigants. 
Importantly, numerous private organizations help litigants in civil 
cases. These organizations include the Legal Services Corporation, 
National Consumer Law Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
law school clinics, and many other institutions and centers (includ-
ing law firms providing pro bono services). Legal aid organiza-
tions—both private and public—screen out applicants and deter-
mine their appropriate level of involvement in each individual case. 
By doing so, they solve most of the problems that arise in the con-
text of direct subsidization. 
Alas, the current demand for services offered by legal aid or-
ganizations far exceeds supply. The state can bridge the gap be-
tween supply and demand by setting up additional legal aid agen-
cies or by funneling more taxpayers’ money into existing ones. 
However, provision of the optimal amount of legal aid is a tricky 
task for the state. First, the state will be hard-pressed to determine 
the aggregate demand for legal aid as well as the particular areas of 
need. This challenge will be compounded by the fact that any at-
tempt at estimating the overall demand for legal services must fac-
tor in the price (or co-pay) at which they will be offered. For ex-
ample, if legal aid were to be given for free, there will be much 
greater demand for it than if it were offered for a price. Second, the 
state will have to supervise the quality of the services provided by 
legal aid institutions. As the number of institutions and employees 
grows, the task will become more complex. Third, and finally, the 
level of funding for legal aid is a function of political priorities. In 
the current economic environment, it would be difficult to con-
vince politicians to commit considerable amounts of money to liti-
gation subsidies. Any fair-minded person would agree that there 
are far more pressing needs at this time. 
147 See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender, 43 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1267 (2006) (describing the history and the role of public defenders’ of-
fices across the United States).  
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D. Equitable Measures and Punitive Damages 
Another possible approach to the challenge posed by strategic 
litigants involves the use of various equitable doctrines, such as bad 
faith, misuse, and unclean hands. Equity constitutes a rich deposi-
tory of various flexible doctrines that enabled judges to achieve 
just results in individual cases. Indeed, as Professor Henry Smith 
recently put it, the point and purpose of the law of equity was to 
combat opportunism.148 Strategic litigation falls squarely in this 
category. As we explained, strategic litigants take advantage of dif-
ferential cost structures to extort unmeritorious payments from en-
titlement holders. This dynamic leads to results that are neither so-
cially efficient nor equitable. 
While the previous measures we discussed focus either on the 
litigants themselves or on their representatives (legal aid organiza-
tions), the current solution puts the premium on the courts—more 
precisely, on the courts and the legislature. We propose that courts 
be given broad discretion to rule in appropriate cases that litigants 
have acted in bad faith or misused their legal rights. In addition, 
courts will be empowered to order strategic litigants to pay their 
victims not just court and attorney’s fees, but also punitive dam-
ages.149 We submit that courts should be able to exercise this power 
not only against private actors, but also against state and federal 
prosecutors and other governmental agents. 
Giving judges broad discretion to counter strategic litigation 
with punitive damages will not only deter strategic litigants, but 
will also motivate the innocent party to take her case to court. The 
introduction of punitive damages will radically reshape the payoff 
structure faced by innocent entitlements’ holders. Currently, they 
have no financial incentive to go to court. For the reasons we ex-
plained, from a pure financial standpoint, settling the case out-of-
court always dominates litigation. However, once the possibility of 
148 Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 17 (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/ 
HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf); see also Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry 
E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent In-
junctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 242–49 (2012) (stating and illustrating equity’s rule 
in counteracting opportunistic behavior). 
149 For the goals and mechanics of punitive damages, see Dan Markel, How Should 
Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383 (2009). 
PARCHOMOVSKY_STEIN_BOOK 9/11/2012 8:26 PM 
2012] The Relational Contingency of Rights 1369 
 
collecting punitive damages is introduced, it will make sense for 
many innocent litigants to defend their entitlements in court. 
This measure should be applied with caution because an increase 
in the level of compensation normally triggers a parallel increase in 
the litigation’s costs. As the stakes get higher, the parties’ motiva-
tion to invest in litigation increases as well. Oftentimes, however, 
the parties’ combined investment in litigation will fail to produce a 
matching social benefit. As Professors Mitchell Polinsky and Ste-
ven Shavell have recently demonstrated, the marginal improve-
ment in deterrence (and other social benefits) brought about by in-
creased compensation may fall way short of the increase in the 
parties’ litigation costs.150 For that reason, courts should be sure to 
award punitive damages only in special cases. As Polinsky and 
Shavell have argued in their earlier work, these special cases in-
clude ones in which under-enforcement of the law creates a short-
fall in deterrence.151 Punitive damages can reduce, or even elimi-
nate, this shortfall at a low social cost.152 By the same token, 
punitive damages can also efficiently minimize the strategic abuse 
of rights when their use is limited to this goal. 153 
150 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Costly Litigation and Optimal Dam-
ages (Jan. 24, 2012) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1990786). Tort litigation that consumes $46 billion per year in litigation 
costs, id. at 2, vividly illustrates this point. Empirical evidence shows that for every 
dollar retained by the victim, the parties collectively expend one dollar on the litiga-
tion process. Id. Assume that litigation costs vary in proportion to damages and grant, 
for simplicity’s sake, that plaintiffs and defendants expend on the litigation the same 
amount, λd, that represents the relevant fraction (λ) of the plaintiff’s damage (d). Be-
cause the parties’ joint litigation expenditure, 2λd, equals the plaintiff’s net recovery 
amount, (1-λ)d, then λ=1/3. Hence, for every dollar retained by the plaintiff, the par-
ties collectively expend on the litigation 67 cents (2/3). Id. at 10 & n.7. If so, every dol-
lar that the torts system awards the victim must generate at least 67 cents in the mar-
ginal gain in deterrence. With every additional dollar that the system moves from 
defendants to plaintiffs, this condition becomes increasingly difficult to satisfy. Id. 
151 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analy-
sis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 896–97 (1998) (arguing that courts should take defendants’ 
probability of escaping liability into account when calculating punitive damages). 
152 Id. 
153 Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–18, 425 (2003) 
(voiding on due process grounds award of $145 million in punitive damages as an ad-
dition to $1 million in compensatory damages against an insurance company that used 
strategic litigation to put unfair pressure on the insured, while indicating that a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will pass constitutional mus-
ter). 
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Unlike the introduction of litigation subsidies, authorizing courts 
to award punitive damages is politically tenable. The concern that 
courts will award excessive punitive damages is not strong enough 
to block the introduction of this measure. This concern can only 
provide a reason for capping the amounts that courts will be au-
thorized to award in punitive damages.154 
That said, some might still criticize our proposal on the ground 
that it will lead to inconsistent court decisions. Some courts will 
routinely order strategic litigants to pay punitive damages, while 
others will not. Worse yet, some courts may overuse their power to 
penalize non-strategic litigants. We will deal with these objections 
in reverse order. 
We believe that the second concern is greatly exaggerated. We 
are not aware of any empirical basis for raising it. In fact, we actu-
ally believe that courts will tend to be reluctant to rule that parties 
acted in bad faith and subject them to punitive damages. In an ad-
versarial system, judges are generally predisposed to exercise re-
straint and hence are likely to use discretionary powers sparingly. 
As for the first concern, while we agree that consistent applica-
tion of the law is desirable, we do not share the view that fear of 
inconsistency should bar the introduction of discretionary powers. 
The issue at hand provides a useful illustration. Opportunism pre-
sents a challenge to lawmakers because it is largely impervious to 
broad generalizations and calls for the crafting of policies that rely 
on ad hoc determinations. Strategic litigation shares this character-
istic. Judges are best positioned to identify opportunistic litigants. 
Their knowledge of the law and experience on the job enables 
them to detect opportunism. No other institution is equally quali-
fied to perform this task. Any legal doctrine that relies on case-by-
case application will inevitably engender inconsistencies. But is 
there a viable alternative that will guarantee uniformity in the 
154 The Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limitations on state courts’ power 
to award punitive damages. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
Specifically, the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the imposition of punitive damages that are grossly excessive or arbi-
trary. Id. at 585–86. The Court explained that the amount of punitive damages must 
reflect the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 575. The Court also set 
up a “single-digit ratio” benchmark for punitive damages: it held that due process 
normally prohibits any award of punitive damages that exceeds the plaintiff’s com-
pensatory damage award by ten times or more. Id. at 581–83. 
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courts’ applications of legal rules without giving opportunism free 
reign and accepting the inequities it brings about? We believe 
there is no such alternative. Inconsistent application of the law is a 
small price to pay in order to preserve the integrity of legal enti-
tlements. 
At the end of the day, we posit that giving courts broader discre-
tion and equipping them with the right doctrinal and remedial tools 
will go a long way toward remedying the problem of erosion of en-
titlements via strategic litigation. Admittedly, the judicial mecha-
nism we propose is imperfect, but its virtues clearly outweigh its 
vices. Furthermore, based on our analysis, this mechanism outper-
forms all the other solutions we considered. Finally, it is the only 
solution that may be acceptable to judges, politicians, and the bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Theodore Roosevelt famously captured the fundamental tenet 
of our free society by saying that “[n]o man is above the law and no 
man is below it . . . .”155 By making rights relationally contingent, 
asymmetrical litigation costs call into question our ability to attain 
this ideal. As we showed, a party who enjoys a cost advantage in 
litigation can effectively prevent her opponent from realizing her 
entitlement. When litigation costs favor one category of litigants 
over another, as we proved to be the case in multiple legal areas, it 
will gradually lead to erosion of entitlements. Existing accounts of 
legal rights largely overlooked the fact that entitlements are not 
self-enforcing. To actualize them in the real world, their holders 
must be able to enforce them cost-effectively. When this condition 
is not met, entitlements become dead letter of the law: they exist in 
theory, but not in practice. As a result, they may be ignored, taken, 
or compromised by strategic parties. The surrender of entitlements 
without legal battle impairs the legal equilibrium contemplated by 
policymakers. Our goal in this Article was to draw attention to the 
effect of asymmetrical litigation costs on legal entitlements. We 
also proposed several institutional responses to this problem. We 
155 Theodore Roosevelt, President’s Message at the Opening of the Second Session 
of the Fifty-Eight [sic] Congress, Dec. 7, 1903, in 1 The Roosevelt Policy: Speeches, 
Letters and State Papers, Relating to Corporate Wealth and Closely Allied Topics 
191, 196 (William Griffith ed., 1919). 
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believe that of the various institutions that can effectively remedy 
the problem, courts are best suited for the task. Endowing courts 
with broad equitable discretion to penalize strategic litigants will 
go a long way toward alleviating the problem. 
